"It also helped spread the idea that medieval and renaissance cooking can be tasty"
Is the countervailing opinion something that even exists and needs to be combatted? IDK, I assume food from any period can be tasty going back to a simple piece of meat over a fire killed by a caveman's flint spear. Seems an odd belief to hold by, well anyone. Food is generally good in any era I've always assumed once you move beyond the standard fare as I'm utterly positive your Italian feast wasn't fish head gruel, the true staple food of medieval modern Italy.
There is a widespread belief that medieval food was overspiced, sometimes on the theory that if was to hide the taste of spoiled meat. In fact the recipes use different spicing than modern European cuisine — as do modern Indian, Chinese, Mexican, ... .
European medieval recipes don't generally include quantities, but such information as I've been able to get, once from one that did, once from a cookbook that had a shopping list for a very large feast from which I could calculate the ratio of spices to meat, suggests that the spicing was consistent in quantity with modern tastes.
There are also other mistaken beliefs, along with the general "dark ages" image.
Fair and seems in line what Townsend (YouTube colonial cooking guy) seems to say too about modern people perception of colonial food. His biggest point is generally they just used different spice or food combos that we aren't used to, i.e. nutmeg in everything, aspic, etc but nothing was really over spiced nor bland.
Rationality does not imply that one doesn't need a commitment device. I am rational, so I need commitment devices, for I can resist anything except temptation, and know it.
"That is also a reason why libertarians should not post bad arguments for their views, however persuasive they sound. Bad arguments drive off readers intelligent enough to see through them."
I went to LibertyCon in Prague to see your talk and for the first time in my life I was surrounded by people who agreed with me (at least at a high level). I was surprised how many of them stated views confidently which to me seemed irrational and upon further probing, they didn't really believe themselves.
It's a pity good arguments so rarely make good sound bites.
On the extreme side, everything becomes clear. Suppose one is confronted with the position that someone wants to wipe out the entire mankind and thus radically solve all human problems. How would one argue against this - in an absolute or undeniable sense? One cannot, one can only give partial reasons against such a radical annihilation. Both movements are rational. Rationality only means pursuing an end by "appropriate" means. One wants to destroy everything, the other wants to live. These are partial rationalities in conflict with each other.
So all that remains is to find out whether the means chosen for a particular end are appropriate for achieving that end. But in principle this is always speculative. Action, and therefore choice, can only take place in uncertainty. Rationality (or efficiency) is therefore always questionable.
You can find out whether the end is one you and other people want. If not you can persuade people to oppose the means. Irrationality is not the only basis on which to criticize actions.
“libertarians should not post bad arguments for their views, however persuasive they sound. Bad arguments drive off readers intelligent enough to see through them.”
Why should not libertarians use bad arguments if such arguments are able to convince enough unintelligent people to sustain the establishment of an order close enough to their ideal? Conversely, if the use of bad arguments is not enough to do the trick for libertarians, why could do it for eg socialists? Are you implying that libertarians can make their ideal prevail only by carrying intelligent people, but the opposite applies to eg socialists?
The argument then applies to you writhing, which a reason for following you. The question remains open whether not so good libertarian arguments may be good for libertarianism. I think the comments below (by David Saracino and Doctor Hammer) make useful complementary points.
(BTW thanks for pointing to the reader to the article on the Positive Theory of Rights, which I found enlightening (I should say that I find Earl Thompson’s rendition of Hobbes’ model wholly implausible: as Hume pointed out the foundation of authority is opinion, not brute force)
I personally believe that Milei is a fairly smart person, but let's assume he isn't and he was in fact convinced by bad libertarian arguments. Would this really be a bad thing since he ended up enacting libertarian policies because of those bad arguments?
I think there's a point in objecting to bad libertarian arguments for the sake of truth, not so much for the sake of libertarianism.
If we use bad arguments we persuade less intelligent people than if we use good ones, and a less intelligent person is more likely to impose libertarian policies incompetently, giving them a bad instead of good reputations.
We want smart libertarian politicians. Which hopefully Millei is.
I think there is something to be said regarding the relative emotional valence of various philosophies and ideologies. Socialism and leftism in general seem optimized for appealing on an emotional level, while libertarianism tends to require more intellectualization or direct experience with why socialism doesn't work. (I have noted many people who are very libertarian about their direct work, but then shift into basic leftism outside of that.) I think Hayek was right that socialism is basically applying the structure of the family to all of society, and so people don't need to be argued into that very hard.
What if someone is drawn to libertarian ideas because of an emotional attachment to the right to self-determination?
I've long been of a mind that any philosophy, no matter how reasoned, has to be built on some fundamental values that are held as axiomatic - that is, emotionally. You might not realize it; or you might espouse certain values and not be aware that they're actually based on even deeper values (and indeed, you might be annoyed at being prodded for those deeper values); and whatever those deep values are might be shared by nearly everyone; but it's nevertheless almost certain they're there. (I don't want to say they absolutely certainly exist, as it's possible I'm wrong, but I've yet to find a counterexample.)
I didn’t say that people can’t be attracted to libertarianism by emotion, but that it tends not to be emotionally appealing compared to other philosophies. It’s always a mix , but some are more optimized to appeal to emotions than others.
The language for this is rarely clear, but I think I took your meaning fine. We agree it's possible to adhere to libertarianism on emotional grounds.
But my point above is that it might be impossible not to, and that it's not really a failing - *every* philosophy might be ultimately emotional, with any amount of reason structured on top.
You're now saying libertarianism might require more reason than other philosophies. ...That might be true for the more popular ones.
Milton Friedman said that "one must not" refute the hypothesis of rationality because its status is not empirical, it is an "irrefutable" logical rule of procedure.
David Friedman says that "we cannot" refute it. Specifically:
"it is hard to test the rationality assumption by observing a single person"
I agree with this position. Its status is empirical and it is in principle refutable. But in practice, to refute it, it would be necessary to observe the desires and beliefs of the individual and show that they are in contradiction with the action. However, "we cannot" (for the moment) observe the desires and beliefs of an individual. Even when that individual is yourself.
Perhaps in the future a machine capable of observing the desires and beliefs of the individual will be invented, and perhaps this hypothesis could be refuted.
A somewhat less serious but perhaps more interesting idea - I find myself thinking a lot about the costs, relative and objective, of various kinds of entertainment. It's wild how much we're willing to spend for certain kinds of things that on some level are entertainment, but how little we'll spend on others.
A $3 movie rental might be two hours of entertainment per person watching, so 4-10 hours pretty easily. Watching the same movie at the theatre could cost 10X as much, even excluding seriously overpriced food and drinks. A video game that costs $60 might be worth 30-50 hours of entertainment. Potentially much more as that same initial cost covers additional people (all the siblings/roommates/spouses can play, or whatever). That's around what a lot of fairly cheap theme parks might charge *per person* for a single day. A trip to a foreign country will cost several orders of magnitude more. We also might put dozens of hours into something that we enjoy, which would be worth hundreds or thousands of dollars if we valued our time at what we make at our day jobs.
Clearly we're not economically rational about entertainment. There's obviously many things we value at wildly different dollar amounts that all fun into the bucket of "entertainment" that doesn't really explain our behavior. Some are more obvious than others - a trip to a foreign country might also be relaxing, exciting, romantic, educational, etc. compared to just entertainment. A movie might even fail to be entertaining while still filling some important use, like evoking thoughts and feelings.
Even so, I feel like we do a really poor job at valuing pure entertainment on a level playing field. Or we lie to ourselves about whether it's in fact pure entertainment instead of fulfilling other purposes. Maybe that $3,000-12,000+ pool table in your house is a status symbol of some kind instead of you valuing it economically for just the entertainment of playing billiards. Otherwise there are a lot of entertainment items that just don't make sense.
If you know that individually each person (that we talk to and evaluate) is acting at least somewhat irrationally, then can we conclude that it's more likely than not that people are not acting particularly rationally in general?
It's certainly possible that we could find that, averaged out over the population, the end result of a mixture of both rational and irrational approaches ends up being rational. But that seems like an unlikely result.
We could also argue that people are truly being rational in pursuit of their goals, but that their goals are simply irrational. For instance making a large meal for strangers is economically irrational, but it's actually quite rational if you do that for enjoyment and did in fact enjoy the experience. In a more complicated sense, even doing things we hate may be rational if it's 1) better than the alternatives, or 2) a step in a longer pathway to something desired at a higher level (i.e. a college degree). This approach doesn't seem to be trying to say the same thing that economic rationality implies, nor does it lead to the same (or likely any) conclusion. It can certainly lead to the tautology that we do what we want, or otherwise we wouldn't have done it. Which would explain obviously bad and irrational decisions just as well as plausibly rational ones.
I do ultimately agree that people try to act rationally in an economic sense. I'm not sure how to square the circle of knowingly making irrational economic decisions that do not result in outcomes I like, and thinking that I'm economically rational. Perhaps the best way to say it is that I'm imperfectly rational and have higher terminal goals than my economic goals, rather than being irrational overall.
The question is not whether it is "more likely than not that people are not acting particularly rationally in general" but whether assuming that people tend to act rationally does better at predicting what they will do than alternative prediction methods. "Not rational action" is a much vaguer prediction than "rational action."
Economists relying on rational choice theory, as seen in classical and neoclassical economics, assume humans are rational actors who maximize utility by weighing costs and benefits based on complete information and consistent preferences. This model, exemplified by thinkers like Adam Smith or modern economists like Gary Becker, predicts behavior in structured contexts like markets, where incentives are clear (e.g., price changes influencing consumer purchases). Studies, such as those in The American Economic Review (e.g., Becker’s 1968 work on crime), show rational choice models can predict aggregate behaviors in economic systems, like labor market trends or investment decisions, with reasonable accuracy when preferences are stable.
However, this approach falters with individual behavior, especially in complex, emotional, or ambiguous situations. Behavioral economics, pioneered by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, demonstrates that humans deviate from rationality due to biases like loss aversion, anchoring, or overconfidence. Their 1979 prospect theory, published in Econometrica, showed people make inconsistent choices under risk, undermining the strict rationality assumption. Even in markets, irrational factors—panic in stock crashes (e.g., 1987 Black Monday) or herd behavior in crypto bubbles—often drive outcomes, as noted in Robert Shiller’s Irrational Exuberance (2000). An economist’s model, assuming strict rationality, misses these psychological nuances, limiting its predictive power for individual actions.
As I interpret this, mainstream economics assumes (for the purpose of broadly accurate theorising, explaining, and predicting) that individuals tend to act with economic efficiency to achieve orthodox objectives. To call this “rationality”—rather than something like “efficient orthodoxy”—seems to add confusion to what is already imprecise. But people do love the rhetorical power of “rationality” and “irrationality”.
I don't think any human being is rational in the way that's defined by economists. We have all kinds of pesky instincts / inborn tendencies that interfere with acting that way, even for those (few?) of us so steeped in economics as to make this kind of rationality our ideal.
It's often possible to come up with ex post facto explanations of specific actions that make them out as rational, but that's not the same as them actually being rational.
There's considerable literature on inborn flaws in human decisions making. I doubt anyone reading this needs citations or a bibliography.
There's less about inborn tendencies to altruism, even when no return is possible. That's usually hand-waved as giving the altruist sufficient pleasure as to be rewarding, whether directly or in terms of self image or reputation. I disagree - those of us not trained out of it will commit random acts of kindness in part simply because it comes naturally.
Other tendencies work the opposite way, with people committing random acts of cruelty, and economists explaining those also as giving them pleasure. Again, it's not thought out, and often occurs when it's plainly not in the actor's self-interest, unless the pleasure involved is enormous. (But in the short term, it's more plausibly the most pleasant choice of action, which gets us back to inborn flaws in human decision making.)
Bottom line: I just don't buy the prevalence of <i>homo economicus</i>. Most of us are a bundle of inborn instincts, overlaid with a layer of cultural expectations, with any rationality as a third layer on top.
I often told students that I was rationally selfish. That is, I never really did anything much that I didnt think would bring me a return in excess of what I ut into my acts and decisions. I gave away things -- time, money, effort, various resources in the firm belief that doing so made my life easier or better over time. They frequently struggled with the idea. As a matter of fact, so did my wife.
And I made use of useful prejudices as well. In fact, I would call my behavior in general as rationally rational. That is, dont try to nail down every single piece of potentially useful data before making a decision. The point is to be overall rational in the possible long run.
I think any difference between my behaviors and those of average other humans is that my time frame for the returns on behaviors tends to be much, much longer than theirs. And I also value being left alone more than they seem to.
> But there is also a commitment strategy involved, summed up in an old verse:
>
> Use it up, wear it out,
> make it do, or do without.
This was a rational heuristic at every place and time except for the modern high-abundance first world where capital is cheaper than labor.
In fact a lot of bad ideas of modern politics can be explained by people on some level thinking this heuristic still applies and/or that the refusal to follow it must lead to some great calamity.
Regarding your bicycling "trick", I don't post articles to convince anybody and I don't expect to ever turn on paid subscriptions; it would feel like I was lying to subscribers. I write my articles because it makes me think more clearly about my Chartertopia scheme; posting publicly adds a sense of duty otherwise lacking. Now if I could only use the same trick for comments to other people's articles ....
Have you considered the possibility that, as a group, people might not always act rationally or even in their own best interests? History and current events have repeatedly shown how media can powerfully influence people's thoughts and emotions, often steering them toward agendas that serve others' interests rather than their own.
A practical example of this is the Energy Star program for consumer appliances. This voluntary initiative costs the federal government under $100 million annually to administer. Even when factoring in the additional costs borne by manufacturers, the program results in net consumer savings exceeding $1 billion, a generous return for the program's administrative expenses. Despite these clear benefits, Trump has vowed to eliminate the program and, it appears, that millions of people will support his doing so. This example raises questions about people's ability to consistently act in their own best interests.
Considering this example, a more insightful question than, "Is David Friedman rational?" is, perhaps, "Are people collectively rational and capable of consistently acting in their own best interests?" The answer to the former seems clearly to be "yes, or at least substantially more so than most individuals." However, the answer to the latter is less comforting. From what I observe, most people do have some level of rationality, but they're also relatively susceptible to manipulation, often supporting policies that don't align with their actual interests. And it appears that those who may lack access to comprehensive information or critical-thinking skills are the easiest targets for manipulation, so, while the group that reads/posts on this substack may not be easily fooled, how protective should this group be of those who would be more easily taken advantage of?
If my perception holds true, doesn't this undermine some foundational assumptions underlying libertarianism, particularly its claim to be a more beneficial approach to government by relying more heavily on individuals making rational decisions, and less on government "interference" with the free market? While libertarians may claim improved education, less interference by government, or increased access to unregulated information could reduce vulnerability to manipulation, the evidence we have seen, so far, appears to indicate the opposite.
"Even when factoring in the additional costs borne by manufacturers, the program results in net consumer savings exceeding \$1 billion"
That assumes that making appliances more energy efficient doesn't affect their performance, that the only relevant variables are cost of appliance and cost of energy, which is obviously false. To take only the example I am familiar with at first hand, dishwashers now take considerably longer and do a worse job of drying than they did a few decades back, probably because of the government push for energy efficiency.
""Are people collectively rational ..." If they are collectively irrational that is an argument against shifting decisions from the individual to the collective, as in the case of the government imposing energystar requirements. The relevant question is whether they are individually rational. Your evidence they are not is that their individual preference was for appliances that used more energy than they could have, on your simplistic theory that all that matters is how much money it costs to run the appliance rather than how good a job it does.
Regarding the Energy Star program and your dishwasher example, I agree that utility includes more than strict monetary value and encompasses performance, convenience, and other personal preferences. I used this example not to say that cost savings are the only measure of utility or that efficiency comes without potential trade-offs, but rather to highlight a scenario where a program offering substantial financial benefits still encounters significant opposition. This raises the question of whether opposing such a beneficial program truly reflects rational decision-making aimed at maximizing personal utility. Money, while certainly not the sole indicator of utility, can serve effectively as a “universal translator,” allowing us to roughly compare the value of otherwise dissimilar benefits.
Energy Star certification is entirely optional. It allows consumers to choose, in this case, a dishwasher that will save them money or one that will dry their dishes faster and more thoroughly. I have an Energy Star certified dishwasher because I value the money I save more than the time it takes to run (I don’t typically wait around for it to finish) or the fact that sometimes some dishes may still be damp. From your response, is it safe to assume that you have opted for a non-Energy Star certified dishwasher?
You correctly pointed out that my use of the term “collectively rational” was a mistake. What I intended to convey was that many, if not most, individuals frequently make choices that don’t align with their stated or observable long-term interests, often as a result of how manipulatable they are.
This brings me back to my central concern: if individuals can be easily influenced and manipulated to make choices furthering someone else’s agenda that not only don’t maximize their own utility but actively sabotage it, what are the implications? While you and others can recognize and correct irrational choices through deliberate strategies, it is not obvious that most people have the ability to do so.
If individuals can be consistently persuaded to adopt preferences or support policies that might not optimally serve their material or long-term well-being, in favor of, perhaps, the psychological utility derived from group identity or assuaging cognitive dissonance, it calls into question assumptions of systems that rely upon individuals (1) knowing what they want (what provides them utility), and (2) being able to make rational decisions to maximize such utility.
I was mistaken about energystar but correct about dishwasher regulations:
"Dishwasher regulations primarily focus on energy and water efficiency standards set by the US Department of Energy (DOE). These standards, which are updated periodically, specify maximum annual energy use (measured in kWh) and per-cycle water consumption (in gallons) for both standard and compact dishwashers."
So I cannot buy the dishwasher that makes my preferred tradeoff between energy use, water use, and performance. It is those regulations, not energystar, that Trump should be targeting.
You are absolutely correct about federal regulations relating to dishwasher power consumption. While my initial Energy Star example focused on how people may not always act rationally or even in their own best interests, your point about dishwasher regulations that you would like to see Trump get rid of is an interesting one to explore further. From a few internet searches, it's apparent that numerous regulations apply to dishwashers:
• Energy Conservation Standards (DOE): Limits annual energy and water usage.
• FTC EnergyGuide Label: Requires disclosure of estimated annual energy use and cost.
• UL 749 Safety Standard: Addresses electrical shock, grounding, insulation, overheating, and fire hazards.
• CPSC Oversight: Enforces safety recalls and penalizes unsafe designs.
• National Electrical Code (NFPA 70): Covers installation, grounding, and circuit protections.
• Plumbing/Building Codes: Mandate backflow prevention (air gaps or high loops).
• NSF/ANSI 184: Verifies cleaning and wastewater drainage performance.
• FDA Regulations (21 CFR): Ensures safety of food-contact materials, including chemical restrictions (e.g., BPA).
• California Proposition 65: Requires warnings about chemicals known to cause harm.
• FCC Part 15: Limits unintended radio frequency interference from electronic controls.
And there are even more! It is kind of a wonder that we actually have any dishwashers at all with the number of applicable regulations.
You have indicated that Trump should target regulations that prevent you from making your preferred tradeoff between energy use, water use, and performance. This aligns with a common theme on this Substack: that governmental regulations are often excessive, and that the free market with individuals pursuing their own utility, would generally yield better outcomes in manufacturing, decision-making, and even self-regulation. I certainly agree with the clean simple appeal of this argument but I still think the government should regulate safety features, and information disclosure, so shoppers can make informed comparative decisions.
Given the likely diversity of opinion on what, exactly, should be regulated, and using dishwashers as an example to understand how you would approach reducing or eliminating governmental regulations, how would you suggest determining which of the above regulations represent an appropriate domain for governmental intervention?
I take the argument one step further back. The question is not which regulations are desirable but whether giving government the power to regulate will, on net, result in more benefit from good regulations or cost from bad ones. Your approach implicitly models the government as a philosopher king trying to do good. Mine models government action as the outcome of a political market, a set of individuals each acting in his own interest as best he can under a different set of rules than those of the private market. I argue that the factors that sometimes produce suboptimal outcomes on the private market exist and are much more common on the political market, hence that switching decisions to the latter usually makes things worse, not better.
Your assertion that I am advocating a philosopher king model is incorrect. I have been advocating from more of a paternalistic libertarian perspective. Given your argument that the 'political market' tends to produce suboptimal outcomes, is your position (1) that government should have no regulatory power because, on net, its regulations produce more harm than good, or (2) that government should retain regulatory power but with sharp limitations, since private markets generally yield better outcomes? If it is the latter, I am interested in how you propose translating this theory into practice. I have already indicated my view that governmental regulation is more appropriate when it comes to safety and to information disclosure. Specifically, what criteria would you use to determine which regulations the government should be permitted to implement?
"It also helped spread the idea that medieval and renaissance cooking can be tasty"
Is the countervailing opinion something that even exists and needs to be combatted? IDK, I assume food from any period can be tasty going back to a simple piece of meat over a fire killed by a caveman's flint spear. Seems an odd belief to hold by, well anyone. Food is generally good in any era I've always assumed once you move beyond the standard fare as I'm utterly positive your Italian feast wasn't fish head gruel, the true staple food of medieval modern Italy.
There is a widespread belief that medieval food was overspiced, sometimes on the theory that if was to hide the taste of spoiled meat. In fact the recipes use different spicing than modern European cuisine — as do modern Indian, Chinese, Mexican, ... .
European medieval recipes don't generally include quantities, but such information as I've been able to get, once from one that did, once from a cookbook that had a shopping list for a very large feast from which I could calculate the ratio of spices to meat, suggests that the spicing was consistent in quantity with modern tastes.
There are also other mistaken beliefs, along with the general "dark ages" image.
Fair and seems in line what Townsend (YouTube colonial cooking guy) seems to say too about modern people perception of colonial food. His biggest point is generally they just used different spice or food combos that we aren't used to, i.e. nutmeg in everything, aspic, etc but nothing was really over spiced nor bland.
Rationality does not imply that one doesn't need a commitment device. I am rational, so I need commitment devices, for I can resist anything except temptation, and know it.
"That is also a reason why libertarians should not post bad arguments for their views, however persuasive they sound. Bad arguments drive off readers intelligent enough to see through them."
I went to LibertyCon in Prague to see your talk and for the first time in my life I was surrounded by people who agreed with me (at least at a high level). I was surprised how many of them stated views confidently which to me seemed irrational and upon further probing, they didn't really believe themselves.
It's a pity good arguments so rarely make good sound bites.
On the extreme side, everything becomes clear. Suppose one is confronted with the position that someone wants to wipe out the entire mankind and thus radically solve all human problems. How would one argue against this - in an absolute or undeniable sense? One cannot, one can only give partial reasons against such a radical annihilation. Both movements are rational. Rationality only means pursuing an end by "appropriate" means. One wants to destroy everything, the other wants to live. These are partial rationalities in conflict with each other.
So all that remains is to find out whether the means chosen for a particular end are appropriate for achieving that end. But in principle this is always speculative. Action, and therefore choice, can only take place in uncertainty. Rationality (or efficiency) is therefore always questionable.
You can find out whether the end is one you and other people want. If not you can persuade people to oppose the means. Irrationality is not the only basis on which to criticize actions.
Freedom isn't free.
TANSTAAFL
“libertarians should not post bad arguments for their views, however persuasive they sound. Bad arguments drive off readers intelligent enough to see through them.”
Why should not libertarians use bad arguments if such arguments are able to convince enough unintelligent people to sustain the establishment of an order close enough to their ideal? Conversely, if the use of bad arguments is not enough to do the trick for libertarians, why could do it for eg socialists? Are you implying that libertarians can make their ideal prevail only by carrying intelligent people, but the opposite applies to eg socialists?
Socialists succeeded, starting in the late 19th century, in part by convincing intelligent people of their views.
Getting votes by bad arguments may be a sensible tactic for politicians, but they are not the people I am writing for.
The argument then applies to you writhing, which a reason for following you. The question remains open whether not so good libertarian arguments may be good for libertarianism. I think the comments below (by David Saracino and Doctor Hammer) make useful complementary points.
(BTW thanks for pointing to the reader to the article on the Positive Theory of Rights, which I found enlightening (I should say that I find Earl Thompson’s rendition of Hobbes’ model wholly implausible: as Hume pointed out the foundation of authority is opinion, not brute force)
I personally believe that Milei is a fairly smart person, but let's assume he isn't and he was in fact convinced by bad libertarian arguments. Would this really be a bad thing since he ended up enacting libertarian policies because of those bad arguments?
I think there's a point in objecting to bad libertarian arguments for the sake of truth, not so much for the sake of libertarianism.
If we use bad arguments we persuade less intelligent people than if we use good ones, and a less intelligent person is more likely to impose libertarian policies incompetently, giving them a bad instead of good reputations.
We want smart libertarian politicians. Which hopefully Millei is.
I think there is something to be said regarding the relative emotional valence of various philosophies and ideologies. Socialism and leftism in general seem optimized for appealing on an emotional level, while libertarianism tends to require more intellectualization or direct experience with why socialism doesn't work. (I have noted many people who are very libertarian about their direct work, but then shift into basic leftism outside of that.) I think Hayek was right that socialism is basically applying the structure of the family to all of society, and so people don't need to be argued into that very hard.
What if someone is drawn to libertarian ideas because of an emotional attachment to the right to self-determination?
I've long been of a mind that any philosophy, no matter how reasoned, has to be built on some fundamental values that are held as axiomatic - that is, emotionally. You might not realize it; or you might espouse certain values and not be aware that they're actually based on even deeper values (and indeed, you might be annoyed at being prodded for those deeper values); and whatever those deep values are might be shared by nearly everyone; but it's nevertheless almost certain they're there. (I don't want to say they absolutely certainly exist, as it's possible I'm wrong, but I've yet to find a counterexample.)
I didn’t say that people can’t be attracted to libertarianism by emotion, but that it tends not to be emotionally appealing compared to other philosophies. It’s always a mix , but some are more optimized to appeal to emotions than others.
The language for this is rarely clear, but I think I took your meaning fine. We agree it's possible to adhere to libertarianism on emotional grounds.
But my point above is that it might be impossible not to, and that it's not really a failing - *every* philosophy might be ultimately emotional, with any amount of reason structured on top.
You're now saying libertarianism might require more reason than other philosophies. ...That might be true for the more popular ones.
You seem pretty rational, David 😀
Milton Friedman said that "one must not" refute the hypothesis of rationality because its status is not empirical, it is an "irrefutable" logical rule of procedure.
David Friedman says that "we cannot" refute it. Specifically:
"it is hard to test the rationality assumption by observing a single person"
I agree with this position. Its status is empirical and it is in principle refutable. But in practice, to refute it, it would be necessary to observe the desires and beliefs of the individual and show that they are in contradiction with the action. However, "we cannot" (for the moment) observe the desires and beliefs of an individual. Even when that individual is yourself.
Perhaps in the future a machine capable of observing the desires and beliefs of the individual will be invented, and perhaps this hypothesis could be refuted.
A somewhat less serious but perhaps more interesting idea - I find myself thinking a lot about the costs, relative and objective, of various kinds of entertainment. It's wild how much we're willing to spend for certain kinds of things that on some level are entertainment, but how little we'll spend on others.
A $3 movie rental might be two hours of entertainment per person watching, so 4-10 hours pretty easily. Watching the same movie at the theatre could cost 10X as much, even excluding seriously overpriced food and drinks. A video game that costs $60 might be worth 30-50 hours of entertainment. Potentially much more as that same initial cost covers additional people (all the siblings/roommates/spouses can play, or whatever). That's around what a lot of fairly cheap theme parks might charge *per person* for a single day. A trip to a foreign country will cost several orders of magnitude more. We also might put dozens of hours into something that we enjoy, which would be worth hundreds or thousands of dollars if we valued our time at what we make at our day jobs.
Clearly we're not economically rational about entertainment. There's obviously many things we value at wildly different dollar amounts that all fun into the bucket of "entertainment" that doesn't really explain our behavior. Some are more obvious than others - a trip to a foreign country might also be relaxing, exciting, romantic, educational, etc. compared to just entertainment. A movie might even fail to be entertaining while still filling some important use, like evoking thoughts and feelings.
Even so, I feel like we do a really poor job at valuing pure entertainment on a level playing field. Or we lie to ourselves about whether it's in fact pure entertainment instead of fulfilling other purposes. Maybe that $3,000-12,000+ pool table in your house is a status symbol of some kind instead of you valuing it economically for just the entertainment of playing billiards. Otherwise there are a lot of entertainment items that just don't make sense.
If you know that individually each person (that we talk to and evaluate) is acting at least somewhat irrationally, then can we conclude that it's more likely than not that people are not acting particularly rationally in general?
It's certainly possible that we could find that, averaged out over the population, the end result of a mixture of both rational and irrational approaches ends up being rational. But that seems like an unlikely result.
We could also argue that people are truly being rational in pursuit of their goals, but that their goals are simply irrational. For instance making a large meal for strangers is economically irrational, but it's actually quite rational if you do that for enjoyment and did in fact enjoy the experience. In a more complicated sense, even doing things we hate may be rational if it's 1) better than the alternatives, or 2) a step in a longer pathway to something desired at a higher level (i.e. a college degree). This approach doesn't seem to be trying to say the same thing that economic rationality implies, nor does it lead to the same (or likely any) conclusion. It can certainly lead to the tautology that we do what we want, or otherwise we wouldn't have done it. Which would explain obviously bad and irrational decisions just as well as plausibly rational ones.
I do ultimately agree that people try to act rationally in an economic sense. I'm not sure how to square the circle of knowingly making irrational economic decisions that do not result in outcomes I like, and thinking that I'm economically rational. Perhaps the best way to say it is that I'm imperfectly rational and have higher terminal goals than my economic goals, rather than being irrational overall.
The question is not whether it is "more likely than not that people are not acting particularly rationally in general" but whether assuming that people tend to act rationally does better at predicting what they will do than alternative prediction methods. "Not rational action" is a much vaguer prediction than "rational action."
Is DF rational? Surely not. As a human, he is subject to his unconscious mind, a state of affairs described by psychologists and novelists.
Dostoevsky, Jung, Freud, Nietsche, etc.
Can any of them propose a way of predicting how I will act that does a better job of predicting what I will do than the rationality assumption?
This is what Grok says:
Economists relying on rational choice theory, as seen in classical and neoclassical economics, assume humans are rational actors who maximize utility by weighing costs and benefits based on complete information and consistent preferences. This model, exemplified by thinkers like Adam Smith or modern economists like Gary Becker, predicts behavior in structured contexts like markets, where incentives are clear (e.g., price changes influencing consumer purchases). Studies, such as those in The American Economic Review (e.g., Becker’s 1968 work on crime), show rational choice models can predict aggregate behaviors in economic systems, like labor market trends or investment decisions, with reasonable accuracy when preferences are stable.
However, this approach falters with individual behavior, especially in complex, emotional, or ambiguous situations. Behavioral economics, pioneered by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, demonstrates that humans deviate from rationality due to biases like loss aversion, anchoring, or overconfidence. Their 1979 prospect theory, published in Econometrica, showed people make inconsistent choices under risk, undermining the strict rationality assumption. Even in markets, irrational factors—panic in stock crashes (e.g., 1987 Black Monday) or herd behavior in crypto bubbles—often drive outcomes, as noted in Robert Shiller’s Irrational Exuberance (2000). An economist’s model, assuming strict rationality, misses these psychological nuances, limiting its predictive power for individual actions.
As I interpret this, mainstream economics assumes (for the purpose of broadly accurate theorising, explaining, and predicting) that individuals tend to act with economic efficiency to achieve orthodox objectives. To call this “rationality”—rather than something like “efficient orthodoxy”—seems to add confusion to what is already imprecise. But people do love the rhetorical power of “rationality” and “irrationality”.
https://jclester.substack.com/p/rationality-a-libertarian-viewpoint
I don't think any human being is rational in the way that's defined by economists. We have all kinds of pesky instincts / inborn tendencies that interfere with acting that way, even for those (few?) of us so steeped in economics as to make this kind of rationality our ideal.
It's often possible to come up with ex post facto explanations of specific actions that make them out as rational, but that's not the same as them actually being rational.
There's considerable literature on inborn flaws in human decisions making. I doubt anyone reading this needs citations or a bibliography.
There's less about inborn tendencies to altruism, even when no return is possible. That's usually hand-waved as giving the altruist sufficient pleasure as to be rewarding, whether directly or in terms of self image or reputation. I disagree - those of us not trained out of it will commit random acts of kindness in part simply because it comes naturally.
Other tendencies work the opposite way, with people committing random acts of cruelty, and economists explaining those also as giving them pleasure. Again, it's not thought out, and often occurs when it's plainly not in the actor's self-interest, unless the pleasure involved is enormous. (But in the short term, it's more plausibly the most pleasant choice of action, which gets us back to inborn flaws in human decision making.)
Bottom line: I just don't buy the prevalence of <i>homo economicus</i>. Most of us are a bundle of inborn instincts, overlaid with a layer of cultural expectations, with any rationality as a third layer on top.
Can you use that model to predict what particular thing a random stranger will do more accurately than the rationality assumption?
I often told students that I was rationally selfish. That is, I never really did anything much that I didnt think would bring me a return in excess of what I ut into my acts and decisions. I gave away things -- time, money, effort, various resources in the firm belief that doing so made my life easier or better over time. They frequently struggled with the idea. As a matter of fact, so did my wife.
And I made use of useful prejudices as well. In fact, I would call my behavior in general as rationally rational. That is, dont try to nail down every single piece of potentially useful data before making a decision. The point is to be overall rational in the possible long run.
I think any difference between my behaviors and those of average other humans is that my time frame for the returns on behaviors tends to be much, much longer than theirs. And I also value being left alone more than they seem to.
This all sounds related to an idea called "inclusive rationality" which I learned about from a book called "escaping paternalism".
In the book the authors skillfully push back against behavioral econ.
> But there is also a commitment strategy involved, summed up in an old verse:
>
> Use it up, wear it out,
> make it do, or do without.
This was a rational heuristic at every place and time except for the modern high-abundance first world where capital is cheaper than labor.
In fact a lot of bad ideas of modern politics can be explained by people on some level thinking this heuristic still applies and/or that the refusal to follow it must lead to some great calamity.
What does "capital is cheaper than labor" mean? They are in different units.
Is your height greater than your weight?
It's a heuristic.
Are they not both measured in terms of money, at least by economists?
And what are the units of quantity whose prices are being compared? What amount of (the use of) capital is being compared to what amount of labor"
Regarding your bicycling "trick", I don't post articles to convince anybody and I don't expect to ever turn on paid subscriptions; it would feel like I was lying to subscribers. I write my articles because it makes me think more clearly about my Chartertopia scheme; posting publicly adds a sense of duty otherwise lacking. Now if I could only use the same trick for comments to other people's articles ....
Have you considered the possibility that, as a group, people might not always act rationally or even in their own best interests? History and current events have repeatedly shown how media can powerfully influence people's thoughts and emotions, often steering them toward agendas that serve others' interests rather than their own.
A practical example of this is the Energy Star program for consumer appliances. This voluntary initiative costs the federal government under $100 million annually to administer. Even when factoring in the additional costs borne by manufacturers, the program results in net consumer savings exceeding $1 billion, a generous return for the program's administrative expenses. Despite these clear benefits, Trump has vowed to eliminate the program and, it appears, that millions of people will support his doing so. This example raises questions about people's ability to consistently act in their own best interests.
Considering this example, a more insightful question than, "Is David Friedman rational?" is, perhaps, "Are people collectively rational and capable of consistently acting in their own best interests?" The answer to the former seems clearly to be "yes, or at least substantially more so than most individuals." However, the answer to the latter is less comforting. From what I observe, most people do have some level of rationality, but they're also relatively susceptible to manipulation, often supporting policies that don't align with their actual interests. And it appears that those who may lack access to comprehensive information or critical-thinking skills are the easiest targets for manipulation, so, while the group that reads/posts on this substack may not be easily fooled, how protective should this group be of those who would be more easily taken advantage of?
If my perception holds true, doesn't this undermine some foundational assumptions underlying libertarianism, particularly its claim to be a more beneficial approach to government by relying more heavily on individuals making rational decisions, and less on government "interference" with the free market? While libertarians may claim improved education, less interference by government, or increased access to unregulated information could reduce vulnerability to manipulation, the evidence we have seen, so far, appears to indicate the opposite.
"Even when factoring in the additional costs borne by manufacturers, the program results in net consumer savings exceeding \$1 billion"
That assumes that making appliances more energy efficient doesn't affect their performance, that the only relevant variables are cost of appliance and cost of energy, which is obviously false. To take only the example I am familiar with at first hand, dishwashers now take considerably longer and do a worse job of drying than they did a few decades back, probably because of the government push for energy efficiency.
""Are people collectively rational ..." If they are collectively irrational that is an argument against shifting decisions from the individual to the collective, as in the case of the government imposing energystar requirements. The relevant question is whether they are individually rational. Your evidence they are not is that their individual preference was for appliances that used more energy than they could have, on your simplistic theory that all that matters is how much money it costs to run the appliance rather than how good a job it does.
Regarding the Energy Star program and your dishwasher example, I agree that utility includes more than strict monetary value and encompasses performance, convenience, and other personal preferences. I used this example not to say that cost savings are the only measure of utility or that efficiency comes without potential trade-offs, but rather to highlight a scenario where a program offering substantial financial benefits still encounters significant opposition. This raises the question of whether opposing such a beneficial program truly reflects rational decision-making aimed at maximizing personal utility. Money, while certainly not the sole indicator of utility, can serve effectively as a “universal translator,” allowing us to roughly compare the value of otherwise dissimilar benefits.
Energy Star certification is entirely optional. It allows consumers to choose, in this case, a dishwasher that will save them money or one that will dry their dishes faster and more thoroughly. I have an Energy Star certified dishwasher because I value the money I save more than the time it takes to run (I don’t typically wait around for it to finish) or the fact that sometimes some dishes may still be damp. From your response, is it safe to assume that you have opted for a non-Energy Star certified dishwasher?
You correctly pointed out that my use of the term “collectively rational” was a mistake. What I intended to convey was that many, if not most, individuals frequently make choices that don’t align with their stated or observable long-term interests, often as a result of how manipulatable they are.
This brings me back to my central concern: if individuals can be easily influenced and manipulated to make choices furthering someone else’s agenda that not only don’t maximize their own utility but actively sabotage it, what are the implications? While you and others can recognize and correct irrational choices through deliberate strategies, it is not obvious that most people have the ability to do so.
If individuals can be consistently persuaded to adopt preferences or support policies that might not optimally serve their material or long-term well-being, in favor of, perhaps, the psychological utility derived from group identity or assuaging cognitive dissonance, it calls into question assumptions of systems that rely upon individuals (1) knowing what they want (what provides them utility), and (2) being able to make rational decisions to maximize such utility.
I was mistaken about energystar but correct about dishwasher regulations:
"Dishwasher regulations primarily focus on energy and water efficiency standards set by the US Department of Energy (DOE). These standards, which are updated periodically, specify maximum annual energy use (measured in kWh) and per-cycle water consumption (in gallons) for both standard and compact dishwashers."
So I cannot buy the dishwasher that makes my preferred tradeoff between energy use, water use, and performance. It is those regulations, not energystar, that Trump should be targeting.
You are absolutely correct about federal regulations relating to dishwasher power consumption. While my initial Energy Star example focused on how people may not always act rationally or even in their own best interests, your point about dishwasher regulations that you would like to see Trump get rid of is an interesting one to explore further. From a few internet searches, it's apparent that numerous regulations apply to dishwashers:
• Energy Conservation Standards (DOE): Limits annual energy and water usage.
• FTC EnergyGuide Label: Requires disclosure of estimated annual energy use and cost.
• UL 749 Safety Standard: Addresses electrical shock, grounding, insulation, overheating, and fire hazards.
• CPSC Oversight: Enforces safety recalls and penalizes unsafe designs.
• National Electrical Code (NFPA 70): Covers installation, grounding, and circuit protections.
• Plumbing/Building Codes: Mandate backflow prevention (air gaps or high loops).
• NSF/ANSI 184: Verifies cleaning and wastewater drainage performance.
• FDA Regulations (21 CFR): Ensures safety of food-contact materials, including chemical restrictions (e.g., BPA).
• California Proposition 65: Requires warnings about chemicals known to cause harm.
• FCC Part 15: Limits unintended radio frequency interference from electronic controls.
And there are even more! It is kind of a wonder that we actually have any dishwashers at all with the number of applicable regulations.
You have indicated that Trump should target regulations that prevent you from making your preferred tradeoff between energy use, water use, and performance. This aligns with a common theme on this Substack: that governmental regulations are often excessive, and that the free market with individuals pursuing their own utility, would generally yield better outcomes in manufacturing, decision-making, and even self-regulation. I certainly agree with the clean simple appeal of this argument but I still think the government should regulate safety features, and information disclosure, so shoppers can make informed comparative decisions.
Given the likely diversity of opinion on what, exactly, should be regulated, and using dishwashers as an example to understand how you would approach reducing or eliminating governmental regulations, how would you suggest determining which of the above regulations represent an appropriate domain for governmental intervention?
I take the argument one step further back. The question is not which regulations are desirable but whether giving government the power to regulate will, on net, result in more benefit from good regulations or cost from bad ones. Your approach implicitly models the government as a philosopher king trying to do good. Mine models government action as the outcome of a political market, a set of individuals each acting in his own interest as best he can under a different set of rules than those of the private market. I argue that the factors that sometimes produce suboptimal outcomes on the private market exist and are much more common on the political market, hence that switching decisions to the latter usually makes things worse, not better.
For a more detailed account of the argument see:
http://www.daviddfriedman.com/Machinery_3d_Edition/Market%20Failure.htm
Your assertion that I am advocating a philosopher king model is incorrect. I have been advocating from more of a paternalistic libertarian perspective. Given your argument that the 'political market' tends to produce suboptimal outcomes, is your position (1) that government should have no regulatory power because, on net, its regulations produce more harm than good, or (2) that government should retain regulatory power but with sharp limitations, since private markets generally yield better outcomes? If it is the latter, I am interested in how you propose translating this theory into practice. I have already indicated my view that governmental regulation is more appropriate when it comes to safety and to information disclosure. Specifically, what criteria would you use to determine which regulations the government should be permitted to implement?