If Jones does appropriate it Smith can still buy it from him, or buy the mineral rights while leaving Jones with the surface rights.
Following out the Lockian argument, there are two different effects on B of A's appropriation. One is that B can no longer use the land in ways that don't require appropriation, gather acorns and firewood, c…
If Jones does appropriate it Smith can still buy it from him, or buy the mineral rights while leaving Jones with the surface rights.
Following out the Lockian argument, there are two different effects on B of A's appropriation. One is that B can no longer use the land in ways that don't require appropriation, gather acorns and firewood, cut across the land on his way somewhere else. That is arguably an effect on multiple B's, all of whom could be doing that, although B5 might find that B1-4 had collected all the deadwood.
The other is that B can no longer appropriate the land. Locke's response is that B can appropriate some other land instead, but that breaks down once all the good land has been appropriated.
My preferred response, offered in the chapter I linked to, is that no land is ever appropriated. You achieve the equivalent by doing things with the land such that other people can't use it without violating your rights — not in the land but in wheat plants you planted or in the house and door that you built. It's a kludgy solution and I don't like it very much but it does solve the problem of "how did you get the right to exclude people."
Actually, now that I think about it, you may be able to develop your Second Try in a different way.
Agreed, you have the (temporary) right to the land upon which you are standing. Hence, if someone invades that space, you have the right to /punish/ them proportionally—eg, to do things to them (eg assault them), that would otherwise violate their rights, to nullify that infraction (I ignore deterrence and retribution). Further, if you know that they /will/ invade that space, you have the right to /constrain/ them proportionately—ie, to do things to them (eg block their access to you), that would otherwise violate their rights, to prevent that infraction. Of course, you may not be certain about this. If the chance is 95%, then you may constraint them, but not if it is only 5%. So, if the chance they will invade your space is /higher/ than some number in between—X% let us say—then you have the right to constrain them so as to reduce their probability of invading to X%, but no further.
Now this might justify ownership of a plot around a house, but probably not a fallow field on a farm. For you might reasonably believe that, in the state of nature, there is a sufficiently high risk that people who come near your house are up to no good (the chance need not be high, but the outcome may be very bad indeed). If so, you have the right to constrain them proportionally, and so you can build a fence. However, while this might also justify a fence around your growing crops, it will not justify that fence when the ground is fallow, and you had better not hinder people using the land at that time.
I don't like this justification, since it depends on assuming that people will not sufficiently respect rights in the state of nature, and I would like a justification for land ownership that applies to more respectful folks, but it may be much more realistic.
Or we could imagine that by gathering acorns but not claiming ownership, one has evidence for creation of an easement. Then the acquirer would need to allow them access for the purpose of acorn gathering, or buy back the easement if they wished to exclude this.
In principle it seems potentially very confusing. In practice, it seems unlikely that non-owners would value such easements very highly. I suppose someone could try to hold property owners for ransom by naming an unreasonable price. I think a solution exists.
If Jones does appropriate it Smith can still buy it from him, or buy the mineral rights while leaving Jones with the surface rights.
Following out the Lockian argument, there are two different effects on B of A's appropriation. One is that B can no longer use the land in ways that don't require appropriation, gather acorns and firewood, cut across the land on his way somewhere else. That is arguably an effect on multiple B's, all of whom could be doing that, although B5 might find that B1-4 had collected all the deadwood.
The other is that B can no longer appropriate the land. Locke's response is that B can appropriate some other land instead, but that breaks down once all the good land has been appropriated.
My preferred response, offered in the chapter I linked to, is that no land is ever appropriated. You achieve the equivalent by doing things with the land such that other people can't use it without violating your rights — not in the land but in wheat plants you planted or in the house and door that you built. It's a kludgy solution and I don't like it very much but it does solve the problem of "how did you get the right to exclude people."
Actually, now that I think about it, you may be able to develop your Second Try in a different way.
Agreed, you have the (temporary) right to the land upon which you are standing. Hence, if someone invades that space, you have the right to /punish/ them proportionally—eg, to do things to them (eg assault them), that would otherwise violate their rights, to nullify that infraction (I ignore deterrence and retribution). Further, if you know that they /will/ invade that space, you have the right to /constrain/ them proportionately—ie, to do things to them (eg block their access to you), that would otherwise violate their rights, to prevent that infraction. Of course, you may not be certain about this. If the chance is 95%, then you may constraint them, but not if it is only 5%. So, if the chance they will invade your space is /higher/ than some number in between—X% let us say—then you have the right to constrain them so as to reduce their probability of invading to X%, but no further.
Now this might justify ownership of a plot around a house, but probably not a fallow field on a farm. For you might reasonably believe that, in the state of nature, there is a sufficiently high risk that people who come near your house are up to no good (the chance need not be high, but the outcome may be very bad indeed). If so, you have the right to constrain them proportionally, and so you can build a fence. However, while this might also justify a fence around your growing crops, it will not justify that fence when the ground is fallow, and you had better not hinder people using the land at that time.
I don't like this justification, since it depends on assuming that people will not sufficiently respect rights in the state of nature, and I would like a justification for land ownership that applies to more respectful folks, but it may be much more realistic.
Or we could imagine that by gathering acorns but not claiming ownership, one has evidence for creation of an easement. Then the acquirer would need to allow them access for the purpose of acorn gathering, or buy back the easement if they wished to exclude this.
In principle it seems potentially very confusing. In practice, it seems unlikely that non-owners would value such easements very highly. I suppose someone could try to hold property owners for ransom by naming an unreasonable price. I think a solution exists.