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DavesNotHere's avatar

“the land may, morally speaking, be a commons,”

Common property is not private property, but it is still property. So if property needs a justification, common property needs one as badly as private property does.

A commons is distinct from private property, but both are subject to the same objection. Both of these, and any other imaginable form of property, depend on someone needing consent from someone else to use something, on exclusion. If we try to eliminate this role, and try to regulate use by principle, then whoever disputes an improper use or interprets cloudy cases has the role of owner by default. Consenting to some uses, and disputing and excluding others is what owners do. When someone says “you can’t use that,” they do so either as the owner or as the agent of the owner.

Locke's proviso is an obvious form of exclusion applicable to the commons, but even if we abandon that, others will remain. I can’t build a house on the commons, even if more land remains and is as good. I can’t cultivate crops there and exclude others from harvesting them. My use is excluded if it is the wrong kind, or if I am. Different and perhaps fewer exclusions, but exclusions still. If I attempt to ignore the custom, others can dispute me in court, or in arbitration before the village headman, and win. Or if they lose, it has become private property, hasn’t it?

The solution seems trivial. If something is truly unowned, there is no one with the right to dispute its use. If only one person wants to use something, no one will dispute it. If multiple persons want to use an “unowned” thing, or if one wishes to prevent the other's use, this gives cause for a dispute. The proper owner should win the dispute by showing evidence of ownership, a reason that this use should or should not be excluded.

What counts as evidence of ownership? It is not obvious that different cultures must use the same standards. Libertarians are fond of first possession or first use, and that certainly works. But so long as everyone in a region knows what counts locally as evidence of ownership, there is no obvious reason not to use something else. (Or perhaps the convoluted discussion this has inspired is a reason to think that is the best approach.)

On the other hand, almost no land ownership can be found that is not based on conquest. This doesn’t make private property less useful, but casts some shade on its historical relationship to justice. War not only kills people, but destroys the social basis of custom. It is an injustice, but one of a different scale. Theft is a dispute between persons, with the customary basis of property taken as static. War is a dispute between communities, and unjustly changes the entire basis of property.

On a practical level, an ownership dispute can be settled without reference to original acquisition, if all parties at least agree on some more recent relevant fact of ownership. If farmers Smith and Jones are disputing over the use of a gully, it doesn’t matter whether it once belonged to the the king of England, of Spain, or an indigenous tribe, so long as both Smith and Jones both stipulate that 100 years ago it was definitely owned by farmer Williams. If their dispute is about more recent events, Williams can provide their foundation.

What really is the basis of the criticism of private property? Philosophers love abstract principles. Property is socially significant, but hard to shape into a neat philosophy, either deontological or consequential. It seems too arbitrary.

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Ethics Gradient's avatar

By coincidence I found myself getting to a digression relating to Georgism on Matt Yglesias's substack yesterday and found myself facing the following conundrum, which I wonder if Dr. Friedman or anyone else can opine on:

Specifically, the nominal goal of Georgism is to tax the unimproved value of land ("site value" as used in this post) and leave improvements untaxed. It seems to me, however, that this is conceptually almost without content: the site value is generally agreed to reflect local demand conditions rather than being solely intrinsic to the site in the state of nature. However, the site value of land is clearly also a function of its capacity for improvement: land that a hotel can be built on is worth more than similar land that's prone to subsidence, and technology allowing denser, higher, or cheaper construction raises the value of any individual parcel because it can be more intensively exploited.

This, in turn, indicates that the site value (and the corollary tax basis) should reflect the *as-improved potential* of the land as maximally exploited, not merely, which accords with the general principle that the income flows extractable from real estate are typically the basis on which it is priced.

But if we grant the above, this turns the idea of "not taxing improvements" into essentially a nullity except in rare cares where the site value is demonstrably an internalized value-add rather than the function of latent external demand (e.g., Disneyworld) or in the case that some entity has an exclusive market advantage in their capacity to build cheaply so that the site has higher value to builder A than to builder B, which so far as I know is generally not characteristic of the building trades -- contracting is more of a commodity labor and materials exchange than one that's, say, characterized by ubiquitous patent disputes. In the general case, we expect site value to encompass essentially all of the economic potential of a given parcel, less only the capital costs attributable to building the infrastructure (e.g., an office building, a mine, whatever) that maximally exploits said site value.

I'm not sure that this necessarily poses an insurmountable pragmatic hurdle to the implementation of Georgism, but it does rather seem like it renders the idea of "tax land but not improvements" as have little, if any, content.

I may well be making an error in the above reasoning but, if so, I'm not sure where it lies.

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