Naomi Novik’s three book Scholomance series is very good, indeed addictive — I have been reading and rereading it for months — and the way in which the third book solves the insoluble puzzles from the first two is impressive.
That was awesome, and yeah stick through the first two to get to the third. Think of it as one long story, broke into thirds. Spoiler warnings...
Re: morals and such, There's a genetic, social thing that says family is more important than other. And yeah mawmouths are extreme.... It's like the worst thing to think about, and yet it's your family, so maybe you do that.... I just hope I never come close to any decision like it. I love my kids, I also think suffering has it's place in life, as the adage goes; what doesn't kill me makes me stronger. Would I be one to walk away from Omelas? IDK. There's a desire/bias to say yes.
The other piece of this is that the billionaire is likely accomplishing other useful activities with those billions of dollars. They're probably invested in companies which are providing goods and services to people who want them, in a self-continuing style which produces ongoing wealth and help for people over time.
So it can be argued that there is a benefit to shutting all that down and using the wealth instead for charitable donations, but many people who have considered the question in detail seem to come down on the side of at most siphoning some of the wealth used for consumption into charity, but not the total wealth of individuals who have demonstrated a talent for creating better ways to serve others via businesses.
The cost to save a human life is roughly 5,000 dollars. Thus, a person who can donate up to a billion dollars can save 200,000 lives. Most people think that you shouldn't kill one to save five, but that you should kill one to save 1,000. Thus, the inaction on behalf of billionaires is equivalent, by the implication of common-sense morality, to killing lots of people--almost certainly over 200!
Of course, this doesn't mean that they're indicative of equal viciousness--just that they're equally wrong. If you could either choose for a murderer not to kill 30 people or for Jeff Bezos to give to the against malaria foundation, you should choose the latter--or so says common-sense.
Calculated in utilitarian terms creating enclaves may be justified, as Ophelia argues, just as Omelas is. The point of the revelation in _The Golden Enclaves_, as in the Omelas story, is to trigger our deontological moral intuitions, the ones that make us feel as though no benefit is worth what they are doing. By that standard, the distinction between action and inaction is crucial.
If you disagree, do you feel like a murderer? I don't.
I haven't read the book, so I can't comment on it in any detail. My claim was that, even if you accept the doing/allowing distinction, there are still cases in which not doing something will be more wrong than doing something wrong. For example, if a person could save 200,000 lives but didn't do so because they liked slightly more frivolity in their life style, I'd say that they are doing something worse than a person who saves 200,000 people, but kills one. Thus, the badness of killing one is much less than the value of failing to save 200,000.
I don't feel like a murderer. This is partially because utilitarianism is a theory of moral action, not of judgment of character. But I do agree that there are possible murderers whose lives make things go better than my life does.
I think that our failure to save lives, when we can do so for a few thousand dollars, is as wrong as failing to save drowning children. The difference in our intuitions comes merely from its decreased salience.
That was awesome, and yeah stick through the first two to get to the third. Think of it as one long story, broke into thirds. Spoiler warnings...
Re: morals and such, There's a genetic, social thing that says family is more important than other. And yeah mawmouths are extreme.... It's like the worst thing to think about, and yet it's your family, so maybe you do that.... I just hope I never come close to any decision like it. I love my kids, I also think suffering has it's place in life, as the adage goes; what doesn't kill me makes me stronger. Would I be one to walk away from Omelas? IDK. There's a desire/bias to say yes.
The other piece of this is that the billionaire is likely accomplishing other useful activities with those billions of dollars. They're probably invested in companies which are providing goods and services to people who want them, in a self-continuing style which produces ongoing wealth and help for people over time.
So it can be argued that there is a benefit to shutting all that down and using the wealth instead for charitable donations, but many people who have considered the question in detail seem to come down on the side of at most siphoning some of the wealth used for consumption into charity, but not the total wealth of individuals who have demonstrated a talent for creating better ways to serve others via businesses.
The cost to save a human life is roughly 5,000 dollars. Thus, a person who can donate up to a billion dollars can save 200,000 lives. Most people think that you shouldn't kill one to save five, but that you should kill one to save 1,000. Thus, the inaction on behalf of billionaires is equivalent, by the implication of common-sense morality, to killing lots of people--almost certainly over 200!
Of course, this doesn't mean that they're indicative of equal viciousness--just that they're equally wrong. If you could either choose for a murderer not to kill 30 people or for Jeff Bezos to give to the against malaria foundation, you should choose the latter--or so says common-sense.
Calculated in utilitarian terms creating enclaves may be justified, as Ophelia argues, just as Omelas is. The point of the revelation in _The Golden Enclaves_, as in the Omelas story, is to trigger our deontological moral intuitions, the ones that make us feel as though no benefit is worth what they are doing. By that standard, the distinction between action and inaction is crucial.
If you disagree, do you feel like a murderer? I don't.
I haven't read the book, so I can't comment on it in any detail. My claim was that, even if you accept the doing/allowing distinction, there are still cases in which not doing something will be more wrong than doing something wrong. For example, if a person could save 200,000 lives but didn't do so because they liked slightly more frivolity in their life style, I'd say that they are doing something worse than a person who saves 200,000 people, but kills one. Thus, the badness of killing one is much less than the value of failing to save 200,000.
I don't feel like a murderer. This is partially because utilitarianism is a theory of moral action, not of judgment of character. But I do agree that there are possible murderers whose lives make things go better than my life does.
I think that our failure to save lives, when we can do so for a few thousand dollars, is as wrong as failing to save drowning children. The difference in our intuitions comes merely from its decreased salience.