One thing I have seen no discussion of is Turkey. It has the second largest military in NATO, is close to Russia and has a long history of conflict with Russia. So far it has been neutral, selling, I think, to both sides. If it joined the war on Ukraine's side that might very well reverse the outcome. That doesn't seem likely, but I wonder if it could get bribed by Russia not to.
Reverse the result of the Crimean war? This time the French and British would be on his side.
I don't actually know if there is anything Turkey could gain by intervention. It just struck me as odd that the strongest NATO military other than the US was getting left out of all discussions of conflict between Russia and NATO. When people do calculations of NATO strength vs Russia, do they include Turkey or limit it to the EU powers?
Ukraine is to Putin as Spain was to Napoleon, or Afghanistan was to Gorbachev. An bleeding ulcer that will lead to the fall of the regime. Russia may be 'winning' in the WWI trench line sense, but the economy behind the war effort can not sustain the conflict.
Trump is calling for Saudi Arabia to flood the world market with oil. This was a key reason why he had peace talks with Russia in Saudia Arabia, helping the Saudi regime toward seeing themselves as peace makers and the Russians as unreasonable. Crashing the price of oil will push Russia into a financial crisis as the oil revenue is what is funding their war in Ukraine.
In 1988 Saudi Arabia flooded the world market with oil as a way to force Iran to either negotiate a peace with Iraq or lose its revolution. Iran chose peace. The same crash in world oil prices pushed the Soviet Union, bogged down in Afghanistan, into an economic crisis.
There is a commitment problem implicit in the ceasefire proposal, i.e., a situation where one side can’t trust the other to commit, so it has to lock in its advantage while it can. The question is, how can Ukrainians credibly commit that they won't use the ceasefire to supply new weapons and mobilize new soldiers? Given that Russians have a significant advantage on the battleground now and are advancing on all fronts, this is more of an issue for them than vice versa. Indeed, this is reflected in Putin's statement today:
"I am for it [the ceasefire]. But if we stop here in Kursk for 30 days, it would mean that the Ukrainian military would have several opportunities. How will they use these 30 days? To supply weapons? For forced mobilization? For training? *How can we be sure that none of this will happen in the future?* Who will give the orders to ceasefire? What is the value of those orders? Who will decide? Who and where will violate this agreement?”
As to the European political elite, I think most of them do not believe that Russia presents a serious threat to them. Zelensky had an incentive to try to convince various European countries that they would be the next victim of Putin’s aggression but the reason Europeans embraced that wasn't because they agreed with him but because Russophobia has become an useful tool for European cohesion and a strategy for political incumbents to fight off populist tendencies within their own countries by labeling them as "Russian assets". If this modus operandi reminds you of Russiagate—an attempt by the Democrats to attribute their election loss to Russian interference—you wouldn't be wrong.
I assume that both Ukraine and Russia would use the ceasefire to improve their situation — for one thing their troops are getting a much needed rest. Ukraine can use the time to recruit and train but so can Russia.
Putin is correct that they would need to specify details of what each side was allowed to do and what counted as a violation. But all of that becomes relevant only after they have agreed on the broad terms, and at this point Putin is demanding that Ukraine give up substantial territory, including two cities, that they currently hold. If he drops that demand and agrees to a cease fire on current lines it will then be time to work out the details.
Both sides can use the time to recruit, but as I have said, Russians are the ones who have the advantage on the battleground now, and hence, stand to lose more than Ukrainians if they accept the ceasefire (assuming there is no credible way for Ukrainians to commit not to regroup).
Only two days ago, Zelensky said they would not recognize any occupied territories as Russian, citing this as a "red line". However, Putin said that the recognition of occupied territories was one of the conditions for lasting peace and that "cessation should be such that it would lead to long-term peace". So if Zelensky disagrees with one of Russia's conditions for a lasting peace, and a ceasefire is tied to a lasting peace, why would the Russians agree to a ceasefire? Given the current advantage on the battleground, they have the incentive to continue with the war effort (without the ceasefire) in order to occupy all of the territory they have planned to take and to force the Ukrainian leadership to change its mind and agree to its terms.
The only incentive I see for Russians to engage in a ceasefire now would be to give Trump the opportunity to sell the ceasefire as fulfilling his promise of ending the war, i.e., to show that the "art of the deal" extends to peace-making.
The obvious incentive to agree to a ceasefire is that if they refuse Trump may not only continue but increase support for Ukraine. I don't know whether he can increase it enough to stop the Russian advance or whether Russia is likely to run out of steam on the advance, but the less support he provides the better, from Putin's standpoint, so he would like to appear cooperative while giving away as little as possible.
What either side says is only weak evidence of what terms they will accept. As I said in the post, I think the most plausible compromise is an extended cease fire, each side holding the territory they hold, neither conceding the other's claims to territory. I think Zelensky would accept that, while hoping to reconquer lost territory at some future point, am not sure Putin would. The reasons he might are either that Russia is doing less well than it seems, that he thinks Ukraine's support will fall during an extended peace, or that he is worried that a continued war will scare Europe into rearming, hopes a temporary peace will lull them into not.
Thirteen days later, and a ceasefire is nowhere in sight. I will take that to mean that I was right that given the current advantage on the battleground, the Russians have the incentive to continue with the war effort.
The incentive you mention as obvious is less obvious-- or plausible--to me. The U.S. defense manufacturing capacity is not equipped to sustain long-term or indefinite military support for Ukraine at the current level of demand without significant restructuring of the defense industrial base.
For example, from a CSIS report: "The challenge for Ukraine with this approach is the timeline, as weapons manufacturing takes months or years. Ukraine is expending systems such as 155 mm ammunition at a very high rate, and current production rates and the long time required to ramp up production will mean that they do not have the requisite capabilities for self-defense."
Overreliance on current stockpiles risks depleting U.S. readiness for other threats, while dependence on foreign supply chains (e.g., China) introduces vulnerabilities.
It is also incongruent with Trump's pivot to East Asia.
As I have wrote in my last substack post (https://triangulation.substack.com/p/security-guarantees-are-like-safe), the tragic 'catch-22' of war is that warfare is the most credible method for uncovering information relevant to deciding whether to go to war. And one of those relevant pieces of information is how much skin in the game, and therefore commitment, each party has. The truth is that Trump's administration doesn't have strong commitments regarding Ukraine, Europeans are mostly grandstanding (and using Russophobia for domestic political purposes), while the Russians treat it as an existential threat. Too bad so many people had to die to find out what for many people was clear from the start!
My understanding is that the US was restricting the use of missiles we gave Ukraine to areas of Russia close to the border and not giving Ukraine the longer range version of those missiles. Dropping those restrictions would be an easy way of increasing support. How much difference it would make I do not know.
I also do not know how much ammunition and equipment is out there in the hands of neutral third parties such as India and could be purchased for Ukraine if it was important enough to the US. Or how much the US could expand its production how fast if it was sufficiently important. My impression is that part of the reason why big projects, such as the California high speed rail, take so long nowadays and cost so much is that there are a lot of legal barriers, environmental and otherwise. I expect Trump would be more willing to ignore such constraints if it mattered than the previous administration, might even take Ukraine as an excuse to do so. He appears to be currently gutting the EPA restrictions.
The CSIS report (https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-supporting-ukraine-revitalizing-us-defense-industrial-base) that you reference says that we receive both military and economic benefits by supporting Ukraine. Our defense industry is being strengthened. Our military readiness is being improved. And our economy is being helped. The report says that reducing support would undermine NATO, our security, and the defense industry.
Military spending is a loss (no idea for the Econ 101 term). It is thrown away money. It is not useful. There is no direct economic benefit to building up a military.
Consider your own household. If you were to spend 5% of your income buying ammo and weapons, would you say your household is better off financially?
I do not think Russians see it as an existential threat. In their rhetoric, they do (or rather the people that run the country do).
But almost nobody wants to fight, they need to provide massive financial incentives to keep up recruitment and in fact they need to keep increasing those bonuses. If Russians actually saw the was as an existential threat, they'd act differently.
But you might be right that specifically for the Russian ruling elite, this might be a potential political danger and in their system of government that also potentially means a physical danger of falling out of a window or something.
>in order to occupy all of the territory they have planned to take
This is unlikely to happen unless the US stops supporting Ukraine again (and most notably stops providing intelligence).
Russia is making gains but those gains are literally below snail speed (a snail would have made it from Donbas to Kiev by now). Even just taking the territories they unilaterally proclaimed as Russian is a question of years of fighting at the current rate.
Add to that that Russian advances outside Kursk have actually slowed down since January and both sides getting quite exhausted (but while Russia is probably at its potential, Ukraine's potential is much higher, but it also heavily depends on the political will of its allies).
Actually, I think Putin might want to agree to a ceasfire the moment he retakes Kursk. He seems to be doing that and he needs to do that fast also because Spring is coming and that's mud season in Ukraine/western Russia and everything bogs down. But that's good - the Russians would not achieve much in the next 2 months because of all the mud anyway. And now they will have the ability to recover, regroup, actually train recruits etc. without having to worry about getting shelled. They can accumulate forces close to the frontline without having to worry about those getting blasted by artillery/drones/rockets.
And with those forces there they can either negotiate something Putin can sell as a victory or violate the ceasefire with offensive forces amassed right where they need to be and ready to strike. This also gives them time to build a few more iskanders etc (there are no more stockpiles beyond what they make now and save to use later) to be used en mass to support a major push like that. On the other hand there are major political costs of violating the ceasefire and even Trump might actually get angry (because it would rob him the chance to boast of being a "peacemaker"). So they might want to agree to a temporary ceasefire then present demands which are unacceptable to Ukraine but don't sound obviously unacceptable to someone like Trump. And then launch that offensive.
Ukraine, on the other hand, has to be on the defensive. And they are in a sense winning when they are slowly withdrawing that way. It costs Russians way more to attack than it costs Ukrainians to defend and Russia is moving so slowly that Ukraine can afford to use some strategic depth ... exhausting the Russian army in the process and giving allies some time to act and send actual support. Ukraine really should want the war to continue, it should want to keep withdrawing and use the favourable ratios of losses in the current attritional war to eventually hope to pull a WW1 entente victory (or something close to that). I suspect the main reason Ukraine agreed to the ceasefire was to restore US support and also they in fact bet on Russia never actually never agreeing to one anyway.
Another thing that works in Putins favor is that he can probably violate the terms of the agreement at anytime and there is not much anyone can do about it. So all the conditions are pretty much "optional" for him.
Well, he risks an escalation from the west if he does that. Including an escalation from Trump, I think. If the ceasfire fails, Trump will be very annoyed because he won't be able to crown himself "peacemaker". Given how impulsive he is, he might genuinely ramp up US support in that case ... or not. But Putin doesn't know which would happen and so has to tread carefully.
In a long-term ceasefire between countries that hate each other, the war would be likely to restart from artillery exchanges. One side shells the other's civilians, the other retaliates, it gets worse. Israel, neighbors.
Before Putin invaded, I read what appeared to be a respectable French estimate that Ukraine was shelling Russian civilians worse than Russia was shelling Ukrainian civilians. 20% worse? Can't remember.
If Musk had Starlink keep checking which side is worse, that would be great. Or Google Maps. Putting this in the ceasefire agreement would be nice.
Putting 'peace-keeping' troops in between the armies has not worked ever that I know of, unless the 'peace-keeping' forces are sufficiently disciplined not to cause worse trouble and so strong both sides are scared of them. Ukraine and Russia have very large, tough armies. I would avoid putting an inadequate tripwire force in between like the plague.
There would have to be a ceasefire for this to matter.
Ukraine was fighting a war against separatists, and a lot of civilians were killed, caught in the crossfire, but it's next to impossible to say if they were ethnically Russian or Ukranian. Ukraine and Russia have a historical connection that dates back to Kyivan Rus, which is claimed as a cultural ancestor by both countries. Over the centuries, populations mixed a lot. The USSR encouraged people to move and suppressed nationalist differences to build a "Soviet" identity, which eroded clear ethnic boundaries even further, and left many people with two heritages and no strong ethnic affiliation. I know I have ancestors that are both Ukranian and Russian, but 23andme puts both of these in one ethnic category (same as they put Armenians and Persians). On top of that, Russians and Ukrainians have nearly identical physical appearances. There’s no set way to look Russian or Ukrainian. Traditions, cuisine, and Orthodox Christianity are shared by both groups.
Then I screwed up context. If I was a Russian citizen in disputed territories in Ukraine since 2014, I'd leave in some haste. I'd figure everyone who could left.
I meant Russian ethnics in Ukraine.
Poster below, triangulation, who has my thanks, found my source, which still looks respectable. I respectfully request anyone who has any information on my source's respectability to post. From source:
'On 11th February, President Joe Biden announced that Russia would attack the Ukraine in the next few days. How did he know this? It is a mystery. But since the 16th, the artillery shelling of the population of Donbass increased dramatically, as the daily reports of the OSCE observers show. Naturally, neither the media, nor the European Union, nor NATO, nor any Western government reacts or intervenes. It will be said later that this is Russian disinformation. In fact, it seems that the European Union and some countries have deliberately kept silent about the massacre of the Donbass population, knowing that this would provoke a Russian intervention.'
It depends on what you think of this source. If it is Russian propaganda, then I am wrong to think Ukrainian shelling civilians, sometimes a little worse than Russian shelling ditto, provoked Putin.
As I read Putin, he's a mafyia type. Unreliable to outgroup, but loyal to his own, especially his ingroup throwing his opponents out of windows. He wants to be herd bull for Russia.. Protecting Russian ethnics is a good look for Russia's herd bull. America is Putin's outgroup. Ukrainians who like SS insignia are especially Putin's outgroup.
Zelensky is not reliable either. I remember Zelensky's intelligence openly threatening to kill Elon Musk for not letting Starlink be used for attacks on Russia directly. Musk was already providing Starlink for free to the Ukraine. It is vanishingly improbable that Musk was not acting on instructions from some US government people. both while providing Starlink to Ukraine and while refusing to let it be used to attack Russia directly.
Elon Musk is very valuable to America.
Threatening to kill Musk over this was a sign of unreliable character. It is a death threat to a major US asset over a trivial tactical disagreement between allies.
I have no real knowledge of what is really going on here, and there's endless propaganda.
It was my understanding that the fighting against the separatists was, in large part, instigated by Russia which, starting in 2014, sent Russian troops into the Donbas and that prior to 2014 there was not a war against the separatists. Am I misinformed?
Does the author admit that Russia's support providing weapons, soldiers, and financing, was critical, and without it, the separatist movement would have been quickly extinguished?
"Before Putin invaded, I read what appeared to be a respectable French estimate that Ukraine was shelling Russian civilians worse than Russia was shelling Ukrainian civilians. 20% worse? Can't remember"
Interesting. So far as bias is concerned contrast this:
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Moreover, OSCE observers have never observed the slightest trace of Russian units operating in the Donbass. "
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With this, from a source the article links to:
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FP: What’s the OSCE’s official stance on Russia’s involvement in Eastern Ukraine?
AH: If the question is what we have seen on the ground … we have seen convoys leaving and entering Ukraine on dirt roads in the middle of the night, in areas where there is no official crossing. In one border area, we’ve also made this public, including some footage we have put out. We have seen specific types of weapons that we have described in detail, including electronic warfare equipment. We have spoken to prisoners taken by the Ukrainian forces who claim to be members of the Russian armed forces fighting on rotation in Ukraine. We have seen men with the insignia of the Russian Federation, but you can buy this jacket anywhere. We have also seen the insignia of Germany, Spain, and others—but also of the Russians.
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The OSCE report, on internal evidence, is written from a pro-secessionist, pro-Russian standpoint. That doesn't mean it is wrong — we mostly get the other side of the story — but it is slanted. I quoted some above — the contrast between "never observed the slightest trace" and what, in the source he linked to, is evidence, although not very solid evidence, of Russian involvement.
For another example, the OSCE report has "On 11th February, President Joe Biden announced that Russia would attack the Ukraine in the next few days." What the text linked to actually says is:
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National security adviser JAKE SULLIVAN said a full Russian invasion of Ukraine could come before the end of the Beijing Olympics on Feb. 20, even as President JOE BIDEN today told his counterparts about Moscow’s forces possibly launching an incursion in five days.
“Any American in Ukraine should leave as soon as possible, and in any event in the next 24 to 48 hours,” he said from the White House podium. “We don’t know what’s going to happen, but the risk is now high enough, and the threat is now immediate enough, that this is what prudence demands.”
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Converting "possibly launching an incursion" hence Americans should get out into "announced that Russia would attack the Ukraine in the next few days" strikes me as clear evidence of slanted writing.
The OSCE piece has:
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In his speech of February 24, Vladimir Putin stated the two objectives of his operation: “demilitarize” and “denazify” the Ukraine. So, it is not a question of taking over the Ukraine, nor even, presumably, of occupying it; and certainly not of destroying it.
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The author takes it for granted that Putin is telling the truth.
The piece was published in 2022 and gives an account of the military situation that we now know was false:
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At this stage, Russian forces are slowly tightening the noose, but are no longer under time pressure. Their demilitarization goal is all but achieved and the remaining Ukrainian forces no longer have an operational and strategic command structure.
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That was written three years ago and is good evidence that the author was basing his view on Russian claims.
So yes, there is clear internal evidence that it is a biased account — which does not tell us how much of what it says is true.
I may make this the basis of another post, not on Ukraine but on evaluating sources of information on internal evidence.
The Postil article I linked above is not the OSCE report. It was written by Jacques Baud, "former colonel of the General Staff, ex-member of the Swiss strategic intelligence". I linked it only because it contains the OSCE graphs showing the increase in shelling in Donbass. It's been a long time since I read it, so I would have to reread it to refresh my memory of how biased Baud's account is.
I will only address your first evidence of Baud's bias, the most important one in my opinion.
I assume you missed the correction at the bottom of the FP article. It states:
"Clarification, October 25, 2018: In an earlier version, Hug stated that OSCE had not seen direct evidence of Russian involvement in eastern Ukraine. We have removed this remark, as it did not convey his intended view. He goes on to cite facts and observations that his monitors have recorded."
So, it appears that Baud had only seen the earlier version. It's not clear whether the "facts and observations" were also in the earlier version (or added later). I assume they were in the earlier version. If so, the charitable interpretation would be that Baud wanted to say:
"OSCE observers have never observed the DIRECT EVIDENCE of Russian units operating in the Donbass."
One thing to keep in mind is that Baud is a former military official, not an intellectual or an academic, and so perhaps more crude in his writing, neglecting nuances (especially if he wrote the text in English, which is not his mother tongue).
I must say that I consider the Foreign Policy's decision to remove Hug's statement regarding the absence of "direct evidence" from the interview as odd and even wrong. The reason is that the "facts and observation" Hug mentions are not by themselves *direct* evidence of Russian involvement. For example, people like Igor Girkin had connections in the Russian military, and the military equipment he mentions, "convoys leaving and entering Ukraine," could have been transported without Putin's approval.
Removing that part of Hug's answer makes it less probable that the reader will recognize that those "facts and observations" are not *direct* evidence of Russian involvement (i.e., the involvement of the Russian government). So, besides Baud's bias, it seems we could even talk about whether FP magazine and/or their editorial choice of exclusion was biased. :)
Before Putin invaded Ulraine, I thought stuff about Putin invading Ukraine was twaddle. Putin has a long record of being cautious. I was wrong, Putin invaded.
Was this source biased? If so, I am biased. discount my views.
As a crime, I was not surprised Putin invaded. Putin, chekist Godfather.
As a blunder? Deeply surprised me. Flashy war, not like having a fellow who mildly annoys you defenstrated. A huge war, everyone sees, deeply surprised me. A blunder, Putin does not make many blunders.
Why would Putin make this blunder? As I see Putin, he reads the room and does the thing everyone in the room thinks a serious man will do. Putin deeply wants to be and be seen as a serious man.
Maybe the Soviet General Staff told Putin to invade? They all got riled and took testosterone shots and said War. Soviet General Staff is tough, but does not often tell the boss to make a flashy blunder.
Maybe Biden's staff riled Putin? It was a period of triumphalist transexual D party enutheism They tell Putin to castrate Russia's sons and spay Russia's daughters, Putin gets riled and listens to the Soviet General Staff. But Putin is tough and has heard much twaddle.
Maybe Putin listened to Russian ethnic refugees from Ukraine? They tell him everyone in Ukraine hates Zelensky, he feels a duty to lo listen to fellow Russian ethnics, he feels a duty to listen, he listens. He blunders.
Trusting refugees from a fiasco, it is a classic blunder. I would go with this blunder. Putin makes few unforced mistakes. This war was an only perhaps very partially forced mistake.
Very good analysis. My impression (from the European side of the Atlantic) is that many if not most Europeans are desperate to believe that re-armament may not be necessary, after all, above all for the costs that it would imply (ideology coming (a distant) second). This may indeed induce Putin to accept a ceasefire on less-than-ideal (for him) terms. Poland and the Nordics will go on re-arming, though. The point on Saudi Arabia and the price of oil is interesting: not sure however that the Saudi would crash the price of oil to do a favour to Trump.
Latest news was that Putin had agreed to some form of cease fire.
About all I would add to the general discussion is that Putin is more untrustworthy than Zelensky. To actually enforce any real cease fire requires some external peace-keeping troops between the two, and currently that could only be the EU.
Can you say it? Huh? P-L-E-B-I-S-C-I-T-E. PlEbiScITe. PLE-bi-scite. PLEEE-biss-eye-t.
None of the "news" networks can say it. Few blogs can say it.
All of them yawp, yawp, yawp, yawp about "democracy," and yet they breathe not this one word that lets the people decide how they, the ones to be governed, should be governed.
Why? Setting aside the ignoramuses, those who mendaciously refuse reference to this word do so because in 2014 and in 2022, in both the Donbas and Crimea, the locals chose by over 90% margins to be governed by Russia.
One data point worth considering is the stock market. The VanEck Defense ETF is up about 50% over the past year (and up 8% over the past month and 16% over the past 3 months), which seems to me to indicate that rearmament has become more likely.
Back to your typical quite good analysis. I am glad to see that you have changed your views of what is more probable - both of the outcome here, and on the most reasonable interpretation of Trump's policy here.
The only place my view *might* differ from yours is that I think the odds of Europe *actually* spending the money to replace the last 3 years of U.S. support of Ukraine are vanishingly small (5% at best), where yours seem a lot higher, if now clearly below 50%.
My main comment / question is: given that Putin is Putin, an endlessly extended ceasefire versus a formal truce seems almost like a distinction without a difference.
In your view, what in practice would the difference be?
"To get it, Russia has consumed a large part of the store of military equipment inherited from the Soviet Union, making it less formidable in any future conflict with Ukraine or anyone else."
A quibble. I do believe the war has been way too costly for Russia, but not in a military sense. Russia is clearly STRONGER militarily now than 2022. Most of those Soviet Equipment was useless in modern warfare. Learning that fact, and learning how to adapt to modern warfare, was way more important to the Russian armies effectiveness.
It's kind of like how the Red Army lost massive amounts of material in WW2, but emerged stronger. "it takes 15000 casualties to train a major general".
Now, as a society Russia is weaker because its been a huge human and economic cost, just as it was in WWII. But I don't actually buy these arguments that we've hurt their military.
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I think Putin will take a deal if he perceives the deal as better then just continuing the conflict. So far what is he being offered in such a deal? A ceasefire that will disadvantage him? A frozen conflict that Ukraine can one day re-ignite when it feels stronger?
If I were Putin I would push for a permanent solution. Formal acknowledgement of his annexations by Ukraine. A pledge not to try to take them back at a later date. No NATO/EU troops inside Ukraine. Not NATO membership. The return of the $300B that was seized at the start of the war. And an end to non-military western sanctions.
Ukraine wants to avoid formal acknowledgment of the annexations and get security guarantees from the west (along with western "peacekeepers" on the ground. If they get this, at some point in the future when they feel stronger there will be some "incident", and they will renew the conflict in the hope of getting back the lost territories.
THis played out in the conference with Zelensky. The deal wasn't to have security guarantees, but Zelensky tried to guilt trump into them live on camera (big mistake). The deal was that America would start to invest in Ukrainian infrastructure and if those investments lasted (i.e. corrupt Ukraine didn't just steal everything) then it would create a natural constituency to want to protect Ukraine.
Re Trump's intentions. I see his slap-down of Zelenski as a necessary negotiating tactic with Putin. Putin must be made to believe Trump is not wholly a Ukrainian partisan, or he isn't worth negotiating with.
One notable consequence of the Ukraine war is how many liberals and libertarians are suddenly capable of understanding the logic of collective defense.
Say EU indeed decides to rearm. I think it will have to put a drastically different kind of people in charge of re-armament. But those people will bring a different kind of mindset which would impact well beyond the re-armament as well. It might change EU entirely. We wont know if that change would be for good or worse.
One thing I have seen no discussion of is Turkey. It has the second largest military in NATO, is close to Russia and has a long history of conflict with Russia. So far it has been neutral, selling, I think, to both sides. If it joined the war on Ukraine's side that might very well reverse the outcome. That doesn't seem likely, but I wonder if it could get bribed by Russia not to.
What would possibly be in it for Erdogan to join the war on Ukraine's side?
Reverse the result of the Crimean war? This time the French and British would be on his side.
I don't actually know if there is anything Turkey could gain by intervention. It just struck me as odd that the strongest NATO military other than the US was getting left out of all discussions of conflict between Russia and NATO. When people do calculations of NATO strength vs Russia, do they include Turkey or limit it to the EU powers?
What would possibly be in it for Erdogan to join the war on Russia's side?
Offensive war is not rational.
Ukraine is to Putin as Spain was to Napoleon, or Afghanistan was to Gorbachev. An bleeding ulcer that will lead to the fall of the regime. Russia may be 'winning' in the WWI trench line sense, but the economy behind the war effort can not sustain the conflict.
Trump is calling for Saudi Arabia to flood the world market with oil. This was a key reason why he had peace talks with Russia in Saudia Arabia, helping the Saudi regime toward seeing themselves as peace makers and the Russians as unreasonable. Crashing the price of oil will push Russia into a financial crisis as the oil revenue is what is funding their war in Ukraine.
In 1988 Saudi Arabia flooded the world market with oil as a way to force Iran to either negotiate a peace with Iraq or lose its revolution. Iran chose peace. The same crash in world oil prices pushed the Soviet Union, bogged down in Afghanistan, into an economic crisis.
There is a commitment problem implicit in the ceasefire proposal, i.e., a situation where one side can’t trust the other to commit, so it has to lock in its advantage while it can. The question is, how can Ukrainians credibly commit that they won't use the ceasefire to supply new weapons and mobilize new soldiers? Given that Russians have a significant advantage on the battleground now and are advancing on all fronts, this is more of an issue for them than vice versa. Indeed, this is reflected in Putin's statement today:
"I am for it [the ceasefire]. But if we stop here in Kursk for 30 days, it would mean that the Ukrainian military would have several opportunities. How will they use these 30 days? To supply weapons? For forced mobilization? For training? *How can we be sure that none of this will happen in the future?* Who will give the orders to ceasefire? What is the value of those orders? Who will decide? Who and where will violate this agreement?”
As to the European political elite, I think most of them do not believe that Russia presents a serious threat to them. Zelensky had an incentive to try to convince various European countries that they would be the next victim of Putin’s aggression but the reason Europeans embraced that wasn't because they agreed with him but because Russophobia has become an useful tool for European cohesion and a strategy for political incumbents to fight off populist tendencies within their own countries by labeling them as "Russian assets". If this modus operandi reminds you of Russiagate—an attempt by the Democrats to attribute their election loss to Russian interference—you wouldn't be wrong.
I assume that both Ukraine and Russia would use the ceasefire to improve their situation — for one thing their troops are getting a much needed rest. Ukraine can use the time to recruit and train but so can Russia.
Putin is correct that they would need to specify details of what each side was allowed to do and what counted as a violation. But all of that becomes relevant only after they have agreed on the broad terms, and at this point Putin is demanding that Ukraine give up substantial territory, including two cities, that they currently hold. If he drops that demand and agrees to a cease fire on current lines it will then be time to work out the details.
Both sides can use the time to recruit, but as I have said, Russians are the ones who have the advantage on the battleground now, and hence, stand to lose more than Ukrainians if they accept the ceasefire (assuming there is no credible way for Ukrainians to commit not to regroup).
Only two days ago, Zelensky said they would not recognize any occupied territories as Russian, citing this as a "red line". However, Putin said that the recognition of occupied territories was one of the conditions for lasting peace and that "cessation should be such that it would lead to long-term peace". So if Zelensky disagrees with one of Russia's conditions for a lasting peace, and a ceasefire is tied to a lasting peace, why would the Russians agree to a ceasefire? Given the current advantage on the battleground, they have the incentive to continue with the war effort (without the ceasefire) in order to occupy all of the territory they have planned to take and to force the Ukrainian leadership to change its mind and agree to its terms.
The only incentive I see for Russians to engage in a ceasefire now would be to give Trump the opportunity to sell the ceasefire as fulfilling his promise of ending the war, i.e., to show that the "art of the deal" extends to peace-making.
The obvious incentive to agree to a ceasefire is that if they refuse Trump may not only continue but increase support for Ukraine. I don't know whether he can increase it enough to stop the Russian advance or whether Russia is likely to run out of steam on the advance, but the less support he provides the better, from Putin's standpoint, so he would like to appear cooperative while giving away as little as possible.
What either side says is only weak evidence of what terms they will accept. As I said in the post, I think the most plausible compromise is an extended cease fire, each side holding the territory they hold, neither conceding the other's claims to territory. I think Zelensky would accept that, while hoping to reconquer lost territory at some future point, am not sure Putin would. The reasons he might are either that Russia is doing less well than it seems, that he thinks Ukraine's support will fall during an extended peace, or that he is worried that a continued war will scare Europe into rearming, hopes a temporary peace will lull them into not.
Thirteen days later, and a ceasefire is nowhere in sight. I will take that to mean that I was right that given the current advantage on the battleground, the Russians have the incentive to continue with the war effort.
Or they hope to bargain the US into giving more to get a ceasefire.
Well, if they get what they want, of course they will agree to a ceasefire.
The incentive you mention as obvious is less obvious-- or plausible--to me. The U.S. defense manufacturing capacity is not equipped to sustain long-term or indefinite military support for Ukraine at the current level of demand without significant restructuring of the defense industrial base.
For example, from a CSIS report: "The challenge for Ukraine with this approach is the timeline, as weapons manufacturing takes months or years. Ukraine is expending systems such as 155 mm ammunition at a very high rate, and current production rates and the long time required to ramp up production will mean that they do not have the requisite capabilities for self-defense."
Overreliance on current stockpiles risks depleting U.S. readiness for other threats, while dependence on foreign supply chains (e.g., China) introduces vulnerabilities.
It is also incongruent with Trump's pivot to East Asia.
As I have wrote in my last substack post (https://triangulation.substack.com/p/security-guarantees-are-like-safe), the tragic 'catch-22' of war is that warfare is the most credible method for uncovering information relevant to deciding whether to go to war. And one of those relevant pieces of information is how much skin in the game, and therefore commitment, each party has. The truth is that Trump's administration doesn't have strong commitments regarding Ukraine, Europeans are mostly grandstanding (and using Russophobia for domestic political purposes), while the Russians treat it as an existential threat. Too bad so many people had to die to find out what for many people was clear from the start!
My understanding is that the US was restricting the use of missiles we gave Ukraine to areas of Russia close to the border and not giving Ukraine the longer range version of those missiles. Dropping those restrictions would be an easy way of increasing support. How much difference it would make I do not know.
I also do not know how much ammunition and equipment is out there in the hands of neutral third parties such as India and could be purchased for Ukraine if it was important enough to the US. Or how much the US could expand its production how fast if it was sufficiently important. My impression is that part of the reason why big projects, such as the California high speed rail, take so long nowadays and cost so much is that there are a lot of legal barriers, environmental and otherwise. I expect Trump would be more willing to ignore such constraints if it mattered than the previous administration, might even take Ukraine as an excuse to do so. He appears to be currently gutting the EPA restrictions.
The CSIS report (https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-supporting-ukraine-revitalizing-us-defense-industrial-base) that you reference says that we receive both military and economic benefits by supporting Ukraine. Our defense industry is being strengthened. Our military readiness is being improved. And our economy is being helped. The report says that reducing support would undermine NATO, our security, and the defense industry.
Military spending is a loss (no idea for the Econ 101 term). It is thrown away money. It is not useful. There is no direct economic benefit to building up a military.
Consider your own household. If you were to spend 5% of your income buying ammo and weapons, would you say your household is better off financially?
I do not think Russians see it as an existential threat. In their rhetoric, they do (or rather the people that run the country do).
But almost nobody wants to fight, they need to provide massive financial incentives to keep up recruitment and in fact they need to keep increasing those bonuses. If Russians actually saw the was as an existential threat, they'd act differently.
But you might be right that specifically for the Russian ruling elite, this might be a potential political danger and in their system of government that also potentially means a physical danger of falling out of a window or something.
>in order to occupy all of the territory they have planned to take
This is unlikely to happen unless the US stops supporting Ukraine again (and most notably stops providing intelligence).
Russia is making gains but those gains are literally below snail speed (a snail would have made it from Donbas to Kiev by now). Even just taking the territories they unilaterally proclaimed as Russian is a question of years of fighting at the current rate.
Add to that that Russian advances outside Kursk have actually slowed down since January and both sides getting quite exhausted (but while Russia is probably at its potential, Ukraine's potential is much higher, but it also heavily depends on the political will of its allies).
Actually, I think Putin might want to agree to a ceasfire the moment he retakes Kursk. He seems to be doing that and he needs to do that fast also because Spring is coming and that's mud season in Ukraine/western Russia and everything bogs down. But that's good - the Russians would not achieve much in the next 2 months because of all the mud anyway. And now they will have the ability to recover, regroup, actually train recruits etc. without having to worry about getting shelled. They can accumulate forces close to the frontline without having to worry about those getting blasted by artillery/drones/rockets.
And with those forces there they can either negotiate something Putin can sell as a victory or violate the ceasefire with offensive forces amassed right where they need to be and ready to strike. This also gives them time to build a few more iskanders etc (there are no more stockpiles beyond what they make now and save to use later) to be used en mass to support a major push like that. On the other hand there are major political costs of violating the ceasefire and even Trump might actually get angry (because it would rob him the chance to boast of being a "peacemaker"). So they might want to agree to a temporary ceasefire then present demands which are unacceptable to Ukraine but don't sound obviously unacceptable to someone like Trump. And then launch that offensive.
Ukraine, on the other hand, has to be on the defensive. And they are in a sense winning when they are slowly withdrawing that way. It costs Russians way more to attack than it costs Ukrainians to defend and Russia is moving so slowly that Ukraine can afford to use some strategic depth ... exhausting the Russian army in the process and giving allies some time to act and send actual support. Ukraine really should want the war to continue, it should want to keep withdrawing and use the favourable ratios of losses in the current attritional war to eventually hope to pull a WW1 entente victory (or something close to that). I suspect the main reason Ukraine agreed to the ceasefire was to restore US support and also they in fact bet on Russia never actually never agreeing to one anyway.
Another thing that works in Putins favor is that he can probably violate the terms of the agreement at anytime and there is not much anyone can do about it. So all the conditions are pretty much "optional" for him.
Well, he risks an escalation from the west if he does that. Including an escalation from Trump, I think. If the ceasfire fails, Trump will be very annoyed because he won't be able to crown himself "peacemaker". Given how impulsive he is, he might genuinely ramp up US support in that case ... or not. But Putin doesn't know which would happen and so has to tread carefully.
That's pretty rich, Putin worried about someone else violating a cease fire.
It's also pretty rich for the EU to continue funding Putin's war by buying his oil and gas.
(No suggestions here, just smirking at politicians being politicians.)
In a long-term ceasefire between countries that hate each other, the war would be likely to restart from artillery exchanges. One side shells the other's civilians, the other retaliates, it gets worse. Israel, neighbors.
Before Putin invaded, I read what appeared to be a respectable French estimate that Ukraine was shelling Russian civilians worse than Russia was shelling Ukrainian civilians. 20% worse? Can't remember.
If Musk had Starlink keep checking which side is worse, that would be great. Or Google Maps. Putting this in the ceasefire agreement would be nice.
Putting 'peace-keeping' troops in between the armies has not worked ever that I know of, unless the 'peace-keeping' forces are sufficiently disciplined not to cause worse trouble and so strong both sides are scared of them. Ukraine and Russia have very large, tough armies. I would avoid putting an inadequate tripwire force in between like the plague.
There would have to be a ceasefire for this to matter.
I didn't think Ukraine was shelling any Russian civilians, just Ukrainians in the Dombas who wanted to be either independent or Russian.
Ukraine was fighting a war against separatists, and a lot of civilians were killed, caught in the crossfire, but it's next to impossible to say if they were ethnically Russian or Ukranian. Ukraine and Russia have a historical connection that dates back to Kyivan Rus, which is claimed as a cultural ancestor by both countries. Over the centuries, populations mixed a lot. The USSR encouraged people to move and suppressed nationalist differences to build a "Soviet" identity, which eroded clear ethnic boundaries even further, and left many people with two heritages and no strong ethnic affiliation. I know I have ancestors that are both Ukranian and Russian, but 23andme puts both of these in one ethnic category (same as they put Armenians and Persians). On top of that, Russians and Ukrainians have nearly identical physical appearances. There’s no set way to look Russian or Ukrainian. Traditions, cuisine, and Orthodox Christianity are shared by both groups.
I assumed, in context, that "Russian civilians" meant Russian citizens, not ethnic Russians.
Then I screwed up context. If I was a Russian citizen in disputed territories in Ukraine since 2014, I'd leave in some haste. I'd figure everyone who could left.
I meant Russian ethnics in Ukraine.
Poster below, triangulation, who has my thanks, found my source, which still looks respectable. I respectfully request anyone who has any information on my source's respectability to post. From source:
'On 11th February, President Joe Biden announced that Russia would attack the Ukraine in the next few days. How did he know this? It is a mystery. But since the 16th, the artillery shelling of the population of Donbass increased dramatically, as the daily reports of the OSCE observers show. Naturally, neither the media, nor the European Union, nor NATO, nor any Western government reacts or intervenes. It will be said later that this is Russian disinformation. In fact, it seems that the European Union and some countries have deliberately kept silent about the massacre of the Donbass population, knowing that this would provoke a Russian intervention.'
It depends on what you think of this source. If it is Russian propaganda, then I am wrong to think Ukrainian shelling civilians, sometimes a little worse than Russian shelling ditto, provoked Putin.
As I read Putin, he's a mafyia type. Unreliable to outgroup, but loyal to his own, especially his ingroup throwing his opponents out of windows. He wants to be herd bull for Russia.. Protecting Russian ethnics is a good look for Russia's herd bull. America is Putin's outgroup. Ukrainians who like SS insignia are especially Putin's outgroup.
Zelensky is not reliable either. I remember Zelensky's intelligence openly threatening to kill Elon Musk for not letting Starlink be used for attacks on Russia directly. Musk was already providing Starlink for free to the Ukraine. It is vanishingly improbable that Musk was not acting on instructions from some US government people. both while providing Starlink to Ukraine and while refusing to let it be used to attack Russia directly.
Elon Musk is very valuable to America.
Threatening to kill Musk over this was a sign of unreliable character. It is a death threat to a major US asset over a trivial tactical disagreement between allies.
I have no real knowledge of what is really going on here, and there's endless propaganda.
It was my understanding that the fighting against the separatists was, in large part, instigated by Russia which, starting in 2014, sent Russian troops into the Donbas and that prior to 2014 there was not a war against the separatists. Am I misinformed?
Here: https://www.amazon.nl/-/en/Alexander-Zhuchkovsky/dp/B09YSWS1MY
Does the author admit that Russia's support providing weapons, soldiers, and financing, was critical, and without it, the separatist movement would have been quickly extinguished?
"Before Putin invaded, I read what appeared to be a respectable French estimate that Ukraine was shelling Russian civilians worse than Russia was shelling Ukrainian civilians. 20% worse? Can't remember"
I think you're referring to the OSCE report. The tables can be found here: https://www.thepostil.com/the-military-situation-in-the-ukraine/
My thanks, that looks like it.
Interesting. So far as bias is concerned contrast this:
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Moreover, OSCE observers have never observed the slightest trace of Russian units operating in the Donbass. "
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With this, from a source the article links to:
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FP: What’s the OSCE’s official stance on Russia’s involvement in Eastern Ukraine?
AH: If the question is what we have seen on the ground … we have seen convoys leaving and entering Ukraine on dirt roads in the middle of the night, in areas where there is no official crossing. In one border area, we’ve also made this public, including some footage we have put out. We have seen specific types of weapons that we have described in detail, including electronic warfare equipment. We have spoken to prisoners taken by the Ukrainian forces who claim to be members of the Russian armed forces fighting on rotation in Ukraine. We have seen men with the insignia of the Russian Federation, but you can buy this jacket anywhere. We have also seen the insignia of Germany, Spain, and others—but also of the Russians.
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The OSCE report, on internal evidence, is written from a pro-secessionist, pro-Russian standpoint. That doesn't mean it is wrong — we mostly get the other side of the story — but it is slanted. I quoted some above — the contrast between "never observed the slightest trace" and what, in the source he linked to, is evidence, although not very solid evidence, of Russian involvement.
For another example, the OSCE report has "On 11th February, President Joe Biden announced that Russia would attack the Ukraine in the next few days." What the text linked to actually says is:
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National security adviser JAKE SULLIVAN said a full Russian invasion of Ukraine could come before the end of the Beijing Olympics on Feb. 20, even as President JOE BIDEN today told his counterparts about Moscow’s forces possibly launching an incursion in five days.
“Any American in Ukraine should leave as soon as possible, and in any event in the next 24 to 48 hours,” he said from the White House podium. “We don’t know what’s going to happen, but the risk is now high enough, and the threat is now immediate enough, that this is what prudence demands.”
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Converting "possibly launching an incursion" hence Americans should get out into "announced that Russia would attack the Ukraine in the next few days" strikes me as clear evidence of slanted writing.
The OSCE piece has:
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In his speech of February 24, Vladimir Putin stated the two objectives of his operation: “demilitarize” and “denazify” the Ukraine. So, it is not a question of taking over the Ukraine, nor even, presumably, of occupying it; and certainly not of destroying it.
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The author takes it for granted that Putin is telling the truth.
The piece was published in 2022 and gives an account of the military situation that we now know was false:
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At this stage, Russian forces are slowly tightening the noose, but are no longer under time pressure. Their demilitarization goal is all but achieved and the remaining Ukrainian forces no longer have an operational and strategic command structure.
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That was written three years ago and is good evidence that the author was basing his view on Russian claims.
So yes, there is clear internal evidence that it is a biased account — which does not tell us how much of what it says is true.
I may make this the basis of another post, not on Ukraine but on evaluating sources of information on internal evidence.
A couple of points:
The Postil article I linked above is not the OSCE report. It was written by Jacques Baud, "former colonel of the General Staff, ex-member of the Swiss strategic intelligence". I linked it only because it contains the OSCE graphs showing the increase in shelling in Donbass. It's been a long time since I read it, so I would have to reread it to refresh my memory of how biased Baud's account is.
I will only address your first evidence of Baud's bias, the most important one in my opinion.
I assume you missed the correction at the bottom of the FP article. It states:
"Clarification, October 25, 2018: In an earlier version, Hug stated that OSCE had not seen direct evidence of Russian involvement in eastern Ukraine. We have removed this remark, as it did not convey his intended view. He goes on to cite facts and observations that his monitors have recorded."
So, it appears that Baud had only seen the earlier version. It's not clear whether the "facts and observations" were also in the earlier version (or added later). I assume they were in the earlier version. If so, the charitable interpretation would be that Baud wanted to say:
"OSCE observers have never observed the DIRECT EVIDENCE of Russian units operating in the Donbass."
One thing to keep in mind is that Baud is a former military official, not an intellectual or an academic, and so perhaps more crude in his writing, neglecting nuances (especially if he wrote the text in English, which is not his mother tongue).
I must say that I consider the Foreign Policy's decision to remove Hug's statement regarding the absence of "direct evidence" from the interview as odd and even wrong. The reason is that the "facts and observation" Hug mentions are not by themselves *direct* evidence of Russian involvement. For example, people like Igor Girkin had connections in the Russian military, and the military equipment he mentions, "convoys leaving and entering Ukraine," could have been transported without Putin's approval.
Removing that part of Hug's answer makes it less probable that the reader will recognize that those "facts and observations" are not *direct* evidence of Russian involvement (i.e., the involvement of the Russian government). So, besides Baud's bias, it seems we could even talk about whether FP magazine and/or their editorial choice of exclusion was biased. :)
Before Putin invaded Ulraine, I thought stuff about Putin invading Ukraine was twaddle. Putin has a long record of being cautious. I was wrong, Putin invaded.
Was this source biased? If so, I am biased. discount my views.
As a crime, I was not surprised Putin invaded. Putin, chekist Godfather.
As a blunder? Deeply surprised me. Flashy war, not like having a fellow who mildly annoys you defenstrated. A huge war, everyone sees, deeply surprised me. A blunder, Putin does not make many blunders.
Why would Putin make this blunder? As I see Putin, he reads the room and does the thing everyone in the room thinks a serious man will do. Putin deeply wants to be and be seen as a serious man.
Maybe the Soviet General Staff told Putin to invade? They all got riled and took testosterone shots and said War. Soviet General Staff is tough, but does not often tell the boss to make a flashy blunder.
Maybe Biden's staff riled Putin? It was a period of triumphalist transexual D party enutheism They tell Putin to castrate Russia's sons and spay Russia's daughters, Putin gets riled and listens to the Soviet General Staff. But Putin is tough and has heard much twaddle.
Maybe Putin listened to Russian ethnic refugees from Ukraine? They tell him everyone in Ukraine hates Zelensky, he feels a duty to lo listen to fellow Russian ethnics, he feels a duty to listen, he listens. He blunders.
Trusting refugees from a fiasco, it is a classic blunder. I would go with this blunder. Putin makes few unforced mistakes. This war was an only perhaps very partially forced mistake.
Very good analysis. My impression (from the European side of the Atlantic) is that many if not most Europeans are desperate to believe that re-armament may not be necessary, after all, above all for the costs that it would imply (ideology coming (a distant) second). This may indeed induce Putin to accept a ceasefire on less-than-ideal (for him) terms. Poland and the Nordics will go on re-arming, though. The point on Saudi Arabia and the price of oil is interesting: not sure however that the Saudi would crash the price of oil to do a favour to Trump.
Latest news was that Putin had agreed to some form of cease fire.
About all I would add to the general discussion is that Putin is more untrustworthy than Zelensky. To actually enforce any real cease fire requires some external peace-keeping troops between the two, and currently that could only be the EU.
ONE WORD resolves the entire Ukrainian fiasco:
PLEBISCITE.
Can you say it? Huh? P-L-E-B-I-S-C-I-T-E. PlEbiScITe. PLE-bi-scite. PLEEE-biss-eye-t.
None of the "news" networks can say it. Few blogs can say it.
All of them yawp, yawp, yawp, yawp about "democracy," and yet they breathe not this one word that lets the people decide how they, the ones to be governed, should be governed.
Why? Setting aside the ignoramuses, those who mendaciously refuse reference to this word do so because in 2014 and in 2022, in both the Donbas and Crimea, the locals chose by over 90% margins to be governed by Russia.
One data point worth considering is the stock market. The VanEck Defense ETF is up about 50% over the past year (and up 8% over the past month and 16% over the past 3 months), which seems to me to indicate that rearmament has become more likely.
Back to your typical quite good analysis. I am glad to see that you have changed your views of what is more probable - both of the outcome here, and on the most reasonable interpretation of Trump's policy here.
The only place my view *might* differ from yours is that I think the odds of Europe *actually* spending the money to replace the last 3 years of U.S. support of Ukraine are vanishingly small (5% at best), where yours seem a lot higher, if now clearly below 50%.
My main comment / question is: given that Putin is Putin, an endlessly extended ceasefire versus a formal truce seems almost like a distinction without a difference.
In your view, what in practice would the difference be?
A formal truce might include a monitored withdrawal by both side from the front line, even eventually a mutual reduction of forces.
Just watch Putin`s new green jacket. Zelenski must surrender NOW or his successor with do it tomorrow.
"To get it, Russia has consumed a large part of the store of military equipment inherited from the Soviet Union, making it less formidable in any future conflict with Ukraine or anyone else."
A quibble. I do believe the war has been way too costly for Russia, but not in a military sense. Russia is clearly STRONGER militarily now than 2022. Most of those Soviet Equipment was useless in modern warfare. Learning that fact, and learning how to adapt to modern warfare, was way more important to the Russian armies effectiveness.
It's kind of like how the Red Army lost massive amounts of material in WW2, but emerged stronger. "it takes 15000 casualties to train a major general".
Now, as a society Russia is weaker because its been a huge human and economic cost, just as it was in WWII. But I don't actually buy these arguments that we've hurt their military.
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I think Putin will take a deal if he perceives the deal as better then just continuing the conflict. So far what is he being offered in such a deal? A ceasefire that will disadvantage him? A frozen conflict that Ukraine can one day re-ignite when it feels stronger?
If I were Putin I would push for a permanent solution. Formal acknowledgement of his annexations by Ukraine. A pledge not to try to take them back at a later date. No NATO/EU troops inside Ukraine. Not NATO membership. The return of the $300B that was seized at the start of the war. And an end to non-military western sanctions.
Ukraine wants to avoid formal acknowledgment of the annexations and get security guarantees from the west (along with western "peacekeepers" on the ground. If they get this, at some point in the future when they feel stronger there will be some "incident", and they will renew the conflict in the hope of getting back the lost territories.
THis played out in the conference with Zelensky. The deal wasn't to have security guarantees, but Zelensky tried to guilt trump into them live on camera (big mistake). The deal was that America would start to invest in Ukrainian infrastructure and if those investments lasted (i.e. corrupt Ukraine didn't just steal everything) then it would create a natural constituency to want to protect Ukraine.
Re Trump's intentions. I see his slap-down of Zelenski as a necessary negotiating tactic with Putin. Putin must be made to believe Trump is not wholly a Ukrainian partisan, or he isn't worth negotiating with.
One notable consequence of the Ukraine war is how many liberals and libertarians are suddenly capable of understanding the logic of collective defense.
Say EU indeed decides to rearm. I think it will have to put a drastically different kind of people in charge of re-armament. But those people will bring a different kind of mindset which would impact well beyond the re-armament as well. It might change EU entirely. We wont know if that change would be for good or worse.