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Jorg's avatar

The thing about reputational systems in very large societies is that they make it easy for "cheaters" to abuse the system in the short term in a local area, then move on to a different area of the society and repeat their behavior. I suppose today, with the web, perhaps they would be caught out and followed (and "canceled"?) once they had plundered enough areas. (And perhaps that is why it is so hard to find much personal information about a great many "journalists" and "influencers". They don't want to be found out.)

Anyway, if the policing mechanism is getting a bad reputation for lack of reciprocity, keeping track of 'bad' individuals in a very large population would seem to be a major sticking point to the success fo gifting.

My personal experience is that, when used, it works pretty well in persistent groups with a good grapevine. But I've been on the receiving end of a serious, serial "cheater" who never seems to suffer. So . . .

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Random Reader's avatar

One of my anthropology professors argued that "gift" economies often doubled as insurance systems. When the margin of survival is thin, gift economies can reallocate resources quickly (in exchange for prestige and power, of course).

Then there's the way that gift economies function as time-shifted and indirect barter. One of my anthro professors employed a teenager as a local "informant" and gopher. He paid the kid quite well in the national currency, which was rarely seen in the village. And every time the kid got paid, he would travel to town, spend all of his money on steel tools and T-shirts, and give it all away.

My professor felt like he should encourage the kid to put his money in a bank. But then he realized the kid was doing exactly that: all of those gifts had become favors that the kid could call in later. The exchange wasn't precise, and it wasn't agreed upon in advance. But it represented very concrete wealth, and the kid wasn't shy about guilt tripping someone if necessary.

I would expect these systems to work best in societies where some or all of the following are true:

1. Market mechanisms don't really work for some reason (scale, intangible goods, illegible value, etc).

2. Social status and favors are valuable.

3. Defectors can be punished. (Graeber has an alarming example of a gift society punishing someone who constantly demanded unreciprocated gifts by putting him to death.)

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