Scott Alexander, commenting in his most recent open thread: “… a scientific consensus is also much weaker than a market, because everyone has good incentives in a market (you either make or lose money) but often has bad incentives in a scientific consensus (you lose your job if you disagree, regardless of whether or not it's true; you get promoted if you agree, again regardless . . . ) So using a prediction market as an analogy for a scientific consensus kind of breaks down.”
Scientists are incentivised not to buck the consensus ... unless they have a really good idea that they can prove, in which case they are incentivised to. That's what you get nobels for. The idea that cientific consensus is an entirely conservative force is wrong in theory and practice.
Depending on your definition of good, that’s not necessarily the case. Making money is a clear objective but is that always in alignment with making predictions in any useful sense?
Scientists are incentivised not to buck the consensus ... unless they have a really good idea that they can prove, in which case they are incentivised to. That's what you get nobels for. The idea that cientific consensus is an entirely conservative force is wrong in theory and practice.
>because everyone has good incentives in a market
Depending on your definition of good, that’s not necessarily the case. Making money is a clear objective but is that always in alignment with making predictions in any useful sense?