The Meaning of “Libertarian”

Consider two hypothetical Christians. Christian A considers himself a libertarian, does not believe in the initiation of coercion, believes in property rights. He believes, however, that God, having created everything, is the rightful owner of everything. God has authorized rulers to collect taxes, censor writings, ban drugs and prostitution, enforce slavery. None of that, he will explain, is an initiation of coercion, just the enforcement of God's legitimate property rights. If you don’t like it, stop breathing God’s air.

Christian B does not consider himself a libertarian, has no moral objection to the initiation of force. He believes, however, that God's purposes will best be achieved in a libertarian society. The opportunity to sin with a prostitute will let the virtuous strengthen their virtue by resisting temptation, the truly sinful proceed on their way to Hell. He wants to free slaves in order to let them work out their own salvation or damnation.

Christian A believes in libertarian arguments but not in libertarian conclusions, Christian B reaches libertarian conclusions via non-libertarian arguments. Which is more libertarian?

Christian A is imaginary but there are libertarian philosophers, such as the Bleeding Heart Libertarians on the left or Hans Hoppe on the right, who offer what they believe to be libertarian arguments for conclusions that most libertarians consider inconsistent with libertarianism, such as immigration restrictions, the subject of my next post, or income transfers, discussed in an earlier post. If their arguments are correct, if justice really requires transfers from rich to poor, if states have the right and obligation to restrict immigration in order to protect the rights of their citizens, they are libertarians with regard to those issues, better libertarians than we are. If they are wrong, as I believe they are, do those conclusions make them less libertarian? What does “libertarian,” predicated of a person or a conclusion, mean?

I, arguably, am an atheist version of Christian B. A very long time ago I found it necessary to join the Free Libertarian Party of New York in order to attend a libertarian event. To do so I had to sign a document that said “I certify that I do not believe in or advocate the initiation of force as a means of achieving political or social goals.” I footnoted my signature with something to the effect that the statement was a simplified version of my actual position. The footnote was necessary because although I did not then (or now) advocate any initiation of force, I could imagine circumstances in which I would, some of them described in Chapters 41 and 42 of The Machinery of Freedom. In chapter 41 I demonstrated, at least to my satisfaction, that the simple version of the non-aggression postulate that many libertarians base their arguments on leads to conclusions that very nearly nobody, including libertarians, is willing to accept. In Chapter 42 I offered my conclusion:

In the previous chapter I argued that simple statements of libertarian principle lead to unacceptable conclusions and must therefore be rejected. There is no obvious logical inconsistency in a moral principle that implies that nobody should be permitted to breathe, but it is not a principle that many people are likely to accept.

One possible response is that libertarianism is an absolute principle, an ultimate value which cannot be overridden, but that it is not adequately expressed by the simple statements I have been attacking. …

…

A second response, and one with which I also have a good deal of sympathy, is that there are a number of important values in the world. They cannot be arranged in any simple hierarchy or at least are not going to be any time soon. Individual liberty is an important value in and of itself, not merely as a means to happiness, so we should not be willing to sacrifice large amounts of it in exchange for small amounts of happiness. But liberty is not the only value, nor is it infinitely important compared to other values, so we should not be willing to sacrifice unlimited amounts of happiness for small gains in liberty.

Many libertarians believe that they have derived their libertarian conclusions from the non-aggression postulate. That is not where I got mine. Does that mean I am not really a libertarian — I have from time to time been mistakenly accused of being a utilitarian¹ — or that I, like Christian B, am a libertarian with different arguments but libertarian conclusions?

One possible answer is that it depends on where else the arguments lead. If, as some have argued, my position could be used as easily to argue for statist conclusions, that is a reason to consider me a dangerous influence on libertarianism. If the arguments that Hoppe offers for immigration restrictions could be applied as well to almost any restriction of individual liberty favored by Hoppe and the current right, that is a reason to consider him a dangerous influence on libertarianism. As I do.

I see Hoppe as Christian A, crafting arguments from libertarian premises to non-libertarian conclusions. Immigration is the one clear example where he defends restrictions by presently existing states rather than limiting them to hypothetical voluntary communities in an imaginary anarcho-capitalist future but it is clear from what he has written that he wants to live in a society where there are no homosexuals, libertines, or people permitted to argue for socialism.

That would be much easier to arrange in a society free to coerce people.

1. I like to respond by pointing out that one entry under “utilitarian” in the index of my first book is “why I am not.”