Consider two hypothetical Christians. Christian A considers himself a libertarian, does not believe in the initiation of coercion, believes in property rights. He believes, however, that God, having created everything, is the rightful owner of everything. God has authorized rulers to collect taxes, censor writings, ban drugs and prostitution, enforce slavery. None of that, he will explain, is an initiation of coercion, just the enforcement of God's legitimate property rights. If you don’t like it, stop breathing God’s air.
You may not find too many examples of Christian A, but there is no shortage of Muslims who believe that sharia is God's law, infallible and eternal, (unlike man's law) and that the maximum amount of freedom is obtained when man submits to God's law. It is argued precisely that way -- we need Godly restrictions on our behaviour in order to be more free.
“Meaning of ‘Libertarian’” might appear to suggest either a simple definition or some essence of the word or the idea. What we really need is an explicit philosophical theory of libertarianism that can solve the philosophical problems that arise with libertarianism.
Christian A is not a libertarian in practice (as normally understood). But he is a libertarian in a weird theoretical sense. Christian B is a libertarian in practice (as normally understood). But he is a non-libertarian in a weird theoretical sense. So Christian A is “more libertarian” in theoretical terms while Christian B is “more libertarian” in practical terms.
“What does ‘libertarian,’ predicated of a person or a conclusion, mean?” It usually means that they are libertarian in theory or in practice according to the person making the assessment. And this assessment will always remain open to debate (as everything always is, because of the conjectural nature of knowledge).
>“I certify that I do not believe in or advocate the initiation of force as a means of achieving political or social goals.”
But we clearly do need to engage in “the initiation of force” to deal with crimes against liberty that do not themselves literally initiate force (fraud, shoplifting, trespassing, squatting, etc.). A definition or theory of “force” that declares all unlibertarian acts thereby to be using “force” does not make literal normal sense of “force” and is thus circular rather than explanatory.
Yes, you are “a libertarian with different arguments but libertarian conclusions”. So am I.
The main problem is that a full philosophical theory of libertarianism can only be relatively complicated (at least, compared to the “non-aggression principle”, the “non-initiation of force”, “non-coercion”, etc.). An initial reading of it is unlikely to enlighten anyone in an instant (“Thou know’st we work by wit and not by witchcraft, and wit depends on dilatory time”). The only way to grasp it is to criticise it in detail. I have now made my own theory as concise and precise as I can for substack in a logical sequence of stages:
All labels, especially ones of a political nature, are necessarily simplifications and generalizations of the much more complex and many faceted belief systems that they (mistakenly?) attempt to capsulize and define. If more people ethically and philosophically examined their beliefs as you do such gross symbolic identifications would not be so divisive. Regrettably the majority does not do this and this is why they instead assign labels for their feelings and opinions because they have primarily assumed them from an external source rather than from a personal and individual process of rationalization. While I might identify myself as an atheist, an anarchist, a capitalist and a libertarian I fully understand that these ‘labels’ are my individual opinions of aspects of my belief and that others who use the same ‘labels’ might very well differ in how they define them. While language may be a tool for pursuing clarity of thought, it is an inexact process that only approximates truth rather than concretely defining it.
When a person says that their position flows from argument, give them a reasonable hypothetical situation where their principle leads to an outcome you generally know they wont like.
For example:
When a person argues that second amendment is a natural right, ask them if the illegal immigrant too should be allowed to own firearms in USA because it is a "natural right", if they argue that constitution is only for citizens you can ask them if it is okay to waive the 8th amendment for them too and give them cruel punishment like burning them alive or the rack.
When people argue that an unborn baby is a life and must have same right to life as anyone else, ask them if the State of Texas should help a pregnant illegal immigrant cross the hot dessert in order to help her deliver the baby safely.
I have very basic familiarity with Hoppe's work. Being an academician I do not deny that he himself might be sincere in his arguments but those who use it often come across those who do not want to sound nativist but want to sound libertarian while very deliberately pushing libertarian ideas.
I think people like Hoppe as bad influence on our freedoms as they create bad faith arguments that used by some to coerce others.
I really like the idea of putting a metric on libertarians. I'm less entranced by having a Platonic Libertarian at ground. Wouldn't it be more consistent with libertarianism that each libertarian view himself as ground, and evaluate all others by their distance from himself? One statistic of interest might be the minimal dimension of the graph -- how many flavors of libertarians are there?
“God, having created everything, is the rightful owner of everything.”
This requires either a peculiar or a very casual idea of ownership. In order to use something, we need the owner's consent. I suppose the sort of person who would make this argument might reply that god has given consent in the Bible, or though the church, or in mysterious ways unknown to us. But when there is a dispute, the owner never shows up in court. He has competing incompatible interpreters struggling to speak for him. So it needs more, at the very least. Or should we all join in the squabble, if we think we might represent his genuine will?
Sorry for quibbling over an argument that I suppose was not meant to be taken seriously
"I, arguably, am an atheist version of Christian B." Me too. :-)
First principles are necessary to start to formulate an argument, but consequences matter to complete the argument. Current public discussion has embraced non-consequentialist ethics. In addition, while liberty should have a high value, there are always tradeoffs.
My favorite tradeoff is helping the poor properly, as a government sponsored insurance scheme. Once that is done, other tradeoffs with liberty seems much less pressing.
I think the crux of (paleo)libertarianism lies in the concept of voluntariness.
Could you draw a clear line between voluntariness and involuntariness? If not, there can be no clear derivation from a single libertarian principle of non-aggression or voluntariness or the like to any practical conclusion. Take the occupation of hitherto unoccupied space as a paleolibertarian starting point. In what way is this act entirely voluntary? It excludes latecomers against their will. You could completely fence in a person according to this libertarian "homesteading principle". This is a fuzzy, good rule of thumb, but it is nonsense to make an absolute moral claim (=without exceptions/provisos) out of it.
You may not find too many examples of Christian A, but there is no shortage of Muslims who believe that sharia is God's law, infallible and eternal, (unlike man's law) and that the maximum amount of freedom is obtained when man submits to God's law. It is argued precisely that way -- we need Godly restrictions on our behaviour in order to be more free.
Immigration issue is not a simple one. If there is property then there are borders. Coercion at some point is necessary to enforce the boundaries.
“Meaning of ‘Libertarian’” might appear to suggest either a simple definition or some essence of the word or the idea. What we really need is an explicit philosophical theory of libertarianism that can solve the philosophical problems that arise with libertarianism.
Christian A is not a libertarian in practice (as normally understood). But he is a libertarian in a weird theoretical sense. Christian B is a libertarian in practice (as normally understood). But he is a non-libertarian in a weird theoretical sense. So Christian A is “more libertarian” in theoretical terms while Christian B is “more libertarian” in practical terms.
“What does ‘libertarian,’ predicated of a person or a conclusion, mean?” It usually means that they are libertarian in theory or in practice according to the person making the assessment. And this assessment will always remain open to debate (as everything always is, because of the conjectural nature of knowledge).
>“I certify that I do not believe in or advocate the initiation of force as a means of achieving political or social goals.”
But we clearly do need to engage in “the initiation of force” to deal with crimes against liberty that do not themselves literally initiate force (fraud, shoplifting, trespassing, squatting, etc.). A definition or theory of “force” that declares all unlibertarian acts thereby to be using “force” does not make literal normal sense of “force” and is thus circular rather than explanatory.
Yes, you are “a libertarian with different arguments but libertarian conclusions”. So am I.
I set aside any discussion of libertarianism and immigration controls, but my own explanation is here: https://jclester.substack.com/p/immigration-and-libertarianism
The main problem is that a full philosophical theory of libertarianism can only be relatively complicated (at least, compared to the “non-aggression principle”, the “non-initiation of force”, “non-coercion”, etc.). An initial reading of it is unlikely to enlighten anyone in an instant (“Thou know’st we work by wit and not by witchcraft, and wit depends on dilatory time”). The only way to grasp it is to criticise it in detail. I have now made my own theory as concise and precise as I can for substack in a logical sequence of stages:
1. liberty in itself: https://jclester.substack.com/p/liberty-in-itself-a-libertarian-viewpoint
2. liberty maximisation: https://jclester.substack.com/p/liberty-maximisation-a-libertarian
3. liberty in a state of nature: https://jclester.substack.com/p/liberty-in-a-state-of-nature-a-libertarian
4. liberty in propertarian practice: https://jclester.substack.com/p/liberty-in-propertarian-practice
5. liberty and morality: https://jclester.substack.com/p/liberty-and-morality-a-libertarian
6. critical rationalism and its application to libertarianism: https://jclester.substack.com/p/critical-rationalism
Congratulations, your first example is a thought experiment pointing to why I don't consider myself to be libertarian.
Some proportion of property was originally stolen (aka acquired by initiating force), and the egg can't be unscrambled.
All labels, especially ones of a political nature, are necessarily simplifications and generalizations of the much more complex and many faceted belief systems that they (mistakenly?) attempt to capsulize and define. If more people ethically and philosophically examined their beliefs as you do such gross symbolic identifications would not be so divisive. Regrettably the majority does not do this and this is why they instead assign labels for their feelings and opinions because they have primarily assumed them from an external source rather than from a personal and individual process of rationalization. While I might identify myself as an atheist, an anarchist, a capitalist and a libertarian I fully understand that these ‘labels’ are my individual opinions of aspects of my belief and that others who use the same ‘labels’ might very well differ in how they define them. While language may be a tool for pursuing clarity of thought, it is an inexact process that only approximates truth rather than concretely defining it.
When a person says that their position flows from argument, give them a reasonable hypothetical situation where their principle leads to an outcome you generally know they wont like.
For example:
When a person argues that second amendment is a natural right, ask them if the illegal immigrant too should be allowed to own firearms in USA because it is a "natural right", if they argue that constitution is only for citizens you can ask them if it is okay to waive the 8th amendment for them too and give them cruel punishment like burning them alive or the rack.
When people argue that an unborn baby is a life and must have same right to life as anyone else, ask them if the State of Texas should help a pregnant illegal immigrant cross the hot dessert in order to help her deliver the baby safely.
I have very basic familiarity with Hoppe's work. Being an academician I do not deny that he himself might be sincere in his arguments but those who use it often come across those who do not want to sound nativist but want to sound libertarian while very deliberately pushing libertarian ideas.
I think people like Hoppe as bad influence on our freedoms as they create bad faith arguments that used by some to coerce others.
I really like the idea of putting a metric on libertarians. I'm less entranced by having a Platonic Libertarian at ground. Wouldn't it be more consistent with libertarianism that each libertarian view himself as ground, and evaluate all others by their distance from himself? One statistic of interest might be the minimal dimension of the graph -- how many flavors of libertarians are there?
“God, having created everything, is the rightful owner of everything.”
This requires either a peculiar or a very casual idea of ownership. In order to use something, we need the owner's consent. I suppose the sort of person who would make this argument might reply that god has given consent in the Bible, or though the church, or in mysterious ways unknown to us. But when there is a dispute, the owner never shows up in court. He has competing incompatible interpreters struggling to speak for him. So it needs more, at the very least. Or should we all join in the squabble, if we think we might represent his genuine will?
Sorry for quibbling over an argument that I suppose was not meant to be taken seriously
"I, arguably, am an atheist version of Christian B." Me too. :-)
First principles are necessary to start to formulate an argument, but consequences matter to complete the argument. Current public discussion has embraced non-consequentialist ethics. In addition, while liberty should have a high value, there are always tradeoffs.
My favorite tradeoff is helping the poor properly, as a government sponsored insurance scheme. Once that is done, other tradeoffs with liberty seems much less pressing.
I think the crux of (paleo)libertarianism lies in the concept of voluntariness.
Could you draw a clear line between voluntariness and involuntariness? If not, there can be no clear derivation from a single libertarian principle of non-aggression or voluntariness or the like to any practical conclusion. Take the occupation of hitherto unoccupied space as a paleolibertarian starting point. In what way is this act entirely voluntary? It excludes latecomers against their will. You could completely fence in a person according to this libertarian "homesteading principle". This is a fuzzy, good rule of thumb, but it is nonsense to make an absolute moral claim (=without exceptions/provisos) out of it.